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FISCAL JURISDICTION AND ACCRUAL BASIS
TAXATION: LIFTING THE CORPORATE VEIL TO TAX

FOREIGN COMPANY PROFITS
WILLIAM W. PARK *
"And... there went out a decree.. that all the world should be

taxed." t
INTRODUCTION

"No rules of international law exist to limit the extent of any country's
tax jurisdiction." 1 Although not yet locus classicus, this assertion summarizes a view that finds favor among academic and practicing lawyers. 2
Even if it is admitted that a relevant nexus must exist between the taxing
sovereign and the person, property, or income to be taxed,3 the competing
* Member, Massachusetts Bar; Conseil Juridique, France; Fellow, Selwyn College, Cambridge. B.A. 1969, Yale; J.D. 1972, Columbia; M.A. 1975, Cambridge.
tLuke 2:1 (King James).
1. Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income, 17 TAx L. Rav. 431, 431 (1962)
(footnote omitted). Carried to its logical extreme, the assertion is difficult to take seriously.
If no limits existed, then France could legitimately impose its value added tax on a transfer of
New York realty between two Americans resident in the United States. Subsequent to Professor Norr's statement, immunity of diplomats from taxation became a treaty obligation. See
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961, arts. 23, 33 &
34, U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force Apr. 24, 1964).
2. See, e.g., 1 R. RHoADES, INcOM:E TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS § 1.11
(1975) ("inhere is no rule of international law . . . that limits the United States power to
tax. Such limitations as are contained in the Code are there as a result of policy decisions
made by Congress.") (footnote omitted); D. TmLINoHASr, TAx AsPacrs OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANsAcrIoNs, pt. 5, at 1-2 (1978) ("A nation's assertion of taxing jurisdictions is a policy
decision like any other-a purely mortal determination of the extent to which it. is just, or
prudent, to subject the income of various persons and entities to the exercise of a primal, and
generally onerous, governmental power."); Hadari, The Choice of National Law Applicable to
the Multinational Enterprise and the Nationality of Such Enterprises, 1974 DurE L. J. 1, ("a
country is free to adopt any theories of tax jurisdiction it selects"); Wurzel, Foreign Investment and ExtraterritorialTaxation, 38 CoLUM. L. Rav. 809, 812, 814 (1938) ("Mlaxing
power stems from sovereignty and sovereignty is omnipotence ....
We are merely interested
in knowing: is there anything in the written or unwritten law of nations to indicate a universally recognized rule authoritatively assigning among nations, and thereby impliedly limiting,
the jurisdiction to tax? The answer is very definitely in the negative. . . ."); and writers cited
by F. MANN, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in InternationalLaw, in SToDms IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 95 (1973), especially the statement in Oualid, Les solutions internationalesdu probl~me
des doubles impositions, 25 REvuE DE ScIENcE ET D LtuISLATION FINANC&RES 5, 5-6 (1927)
("En vertu de leur souverainet6, les Etats ont le droit de lever des imp6ts conform6ment aux
principes qu'ils jugent 6quitables, opportuns et pratiques sans se pr6occuper des mesures
prises par leurs voisins.").
3. See F. MANN, supra note 2, at 94-103 (suggesting condemnation of statutes not based
on a "legally relevant nexus"); Liebman, Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Implications
of CCA, Inc., 17 HAv. INTr'L L. J. 335, 341 (1976) (stating that taxation absent "a relevant
nexus or minimum connection between the State asserting jurisdiction and the person, property
or transaction sought to be taxed is ... arbitrary and hence a violation of customary international law").
Four generally accepted. nexuses are: (i) residence of taxpayer, see, e.g., Bowring v.
Bowers, 24 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 608 (1928); Colquhoun v. Brooks,
14 App. Cas. 493, 504 (1889) (Lord Herschell); F. MANN, supra note 2, at 98-99; (ii) nationality of taxpayer, see, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Cook v. Tait, 265
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jurisdictional claims of other states are seldom viewed as imposing limits on

national competence. 4 This Article will examine the conflicts among rival
assertions of fiscal jurisdiction that result from attempts of capital-exporting
states to tax the undistributed income of foreign companies.
A limited liability company is generally deemed to be a legal person
distinct from its shareholders.5 Its profits are therefore not included in the
taxable income of its shareholders until actual distribution of a dividend. As
applied to foreign corporations, this practice is usually referred to as "deferral," a term that presumes its own conclusion about the extent of international fiscal jurisdiction. 6
Within the past fifteen years, however, several capital-exporting countries have introduced comprehensive "accrual basis" tax regimes that disreU.S. 47 (1924);
STATES

§ 30

RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND)

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

(1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT 21]; RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PART II, JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO CRIME, art. 5, reprinted in 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
435 (Supp. 1935)

[hereinafter cited as HARVARD DRAFT CONVENTION]; F. MANN, supra

note

2, at 101; (iii) source of income, see, e.g., De Ganay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376 (1918);
RESTATEMENT 2D, supra, § 17; HARVARD DRAFT CONVENTION, supra, art. 3; F. MANN, supra
note 2, at 97; (iv) situs of property, see, e.g., Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378 (1933); RsTATnmENT 2D, supra, § 17; HARVARD DRAFr CONVENTION, supra, art. 3; F. MANN, supra note
2, at 97.
4. Mann states: "No problem of international jurisdiction occurs [in holding a parent
accountable for the profits of its foreign subsidiary] because the domestic legislation is concerned
solely with measuring the domestic taxpayer's tax liability." F. MANN, supra note 2, at 99.
More generally, he writes that "the doctrine of international jurisdiction is not at present
concerned with exclusivity of jurisdiction . . . ." Id. at 37. Liebman states: "The tax imposed
by the enactment of Subpart F [see text accompanying notes 16-37 inlra] remains within the
jurisdictional limits mandated by international law because jurisdiction is only asserted over
U.S. shareholders." Liebman, supra note 3, at 342-43. See also RESTATEMENT 2D, supra
note 3, §§ 37, 39; Resolution II, 29th Cong., International Fiscal Association, reprinted it
[19751 INT'L FISCAL ASS'N Y.B. at 46:
[I]n international tax matters states should on the basis of the principle of international comity take account of the tax claims of other States where those claims
conflict with their own tax claims, and should avoid . . . unresolved confrontations
of national interests that hinder international trade and economic progress to the
detriment of all States.
5. See generally W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 109-49 (4th ed.
unabridged 1969); L. GROWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 189-217 (3d ed.
1969); R. PENNINGTON, COMPANY LAW 45-55 (3d ed. 1973).
6. "Deferral" is a value-laden term because it suggests that a special concession has
been granted, an implication not made when the rule is applied to domestic corporations.
On "deferral," see generally R. BAMNT & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 278-83 (1974); DEP'T
OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION

MENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doe. ST/ECA/126
WAYS

AND

MEANS,

95TH

CONG.,

IST

SaSS.,

OF PRIVATE INVEST-

(1970); HOUSE COMM.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE TASK

FORCE

ON
ON

FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME 45-59 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN INCOME
TASx FORCE REPORT]; HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94r CONG., 1ST Sass., U.S.
TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME--DEFERRAL AND THE FOREIGN TAX CRIrr (Comm.
Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME]; P. MUSGRAVE,
UNInD STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESrMENT INCOME 81-82 (1969); 3. PECHmAN,
FEDERAL TAX POLICY 160-61 (3d ed. 1977); PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE REauLATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1976) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA CONFERENCE PRO-

CEFDINGS], summarized in 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367 (1976); S. SuRmy, PATHWAYS
TO TAX REFORM'79, 185 (1973); Musgrave, Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment, in THE
ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSmY PROGRAMS 176, 188-93 (Joint Economic Committee, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Musgrave, Tax Preferences]. See also Hearings on
General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pts.
4, 10-12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].

19781

ACCRUAL BASIS TAXATION

1611

gard the company's separate legal personality for the purpose of taxing
shareholders on company income before it is distributed as a dividend.
Under such a tax regime, the accrual of profits to a corporation, rather than
their distribution as a dividend, triggers imposition of an income tax on
some or all of its shareholders. An accrual basis regime may be partial,
with only certain categories of income, such as royalties, dividends, and

interest, being attributed to the shareholders, or it may be complete, applying
to all types of profits.
The United States was the first nation to tax some foreign subsidiaries'
profits on an accrual basis.7 Canada in 1971,8 West Germany in 1972,9
and Japan in 197810 introduced analogous systems for taxing undistributed
income of foreign companies in the hands of their residents. The scope of
this legislation is at present generally limited to income of a passive character,
such as dividends and royalties, or to transactions between affiliated companies.

In the United States, however, serious proposals recently have been

made to extend accrual basis taxation to all types of income.1 1
Disregard of corporate personality does not in itself, of course, violate
any jurisdictional principle of international law. Regardless of the legislators'
intent,1' 2 accrual basis regimes on their face determine only the tax liability
of shareholders subject directly to the taxing country's jurisdiction. Although
the shareholder may not have actually received income, there has in theory
been an accretion to his wealth which is arguably under his command, 13 and
thus subject to the taxing jurisdiction of his state of residence or citizenship.

7. See Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 951964), discussed in text accompanying notes 16-37 infra.
8. Act of Dec. 23, 1971, c. 63, [1970-72] Can. Stat. 1311 [hereinafter cited as Canadian
Income Tax Act]. See generally Brown, International Tax Planning, 24 CAN. TAX 1. 494
(1976); Tillinghast, Canadian Tax Reform and International Double Taxation: A View From
the United States, 21 CAN. TAX 1. 472 (1973).
9. Aussensteuerreformgesetz [AstG] [1972], Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 1713 (W. Ger.)
(subsequent references to AStG will be to this 1972 Reform Law). See generally Killius, A
New German Statute Regulating International Tax Aspects-Its Implications for Multinational
Companies, TAX MANAGEMENT INT'L J., Dec. 1973; Landwehrmann, Legislative Development of
InternationalCorporate Taxation in Germany, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 238 (1974).
10. Sozei Tokubetu Sochi-hoo art. 66-6, Diet Statute No. 14 of 1978, described in
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, TiE INTRODUCrION OF ANTI-TAX HAvEN TAX MEASURES (Foreign
Press Center, Japan, No. R-78-06 1978).
11. The so-called "Hartke-Burke Bill" would have taxed currently the profits of all
American controlled foreign companies. S. 151 & H.R. 62, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); reintroduced in 1974 as S. 3494, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. For a discussion of the bill, see Stone,
United States Tax Policy Toward Foreign Earnings of Multinational Corporations, 42 Gao.
WASH. L. Rnv. 557 (1974). President Carter made a similar proposal in his 1978 Tax Program. The Administration's proposals are set forth in DEPT. OF THE TRASURY, Tam PEsiDaNT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM: DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES OF Tim PROPosALs (1978), and were introduced as H.R. 12078, 95th Cong,, 2d Sess. (1978).
12. In the FO.EIGN INCOME TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 49-50, it is stated that
by extending the controlled foreign' corporation regime "the foreign subsidiary would be subject to current U.S. tax."
13. For discussion of the "constructive receipt" issue, see Hearings on the Revenue Act of
1962 Before the Senate Commission on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7, at 3040 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] (statement of Adrian A. Kragen on behalf of National
Foreign Trade Council, Inc.); id. pt. 6, at 2251 (statement of Randolph W. Thrower, Chairman,
Section of Taxation, American Bar Association); Liebman, supra note 3, at 344-46.
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Piercing the veil of corporate personality does, however, increase the
number of rival claims to jurisdiction over the same pot of income, which
may in turn result in multiple taxation of company profits. Moreover, if the
accrual basis regime applies to income from industrial activity, it may interfere with a state's economic regulation of the corporate entities created by
14
its law and operating primarily, or even exclusively, within its borders.
This Article will suggest an allocation of fiscal jurisdiction aimed at reducing the public strain and the barriers to private transnational investment
that may result from overlapping taxation of profits of a company whose
shareholders reside elsewhere than in the country of incorporation and
management. After a brief description of the mechanics of the existing
accrual basis regimes, the Article will examine the economic and political
consequences of extending the scope of such regimes, as well as their fairness
to the taxpayer. Finally, the Article will explore several ways in which the
conflicts engendered by accrual basis taxation might be resolved.
I.

THE EXISTING

ACCRUAL BASIS REGIMES

The provisions of the existing accrual basis regimes are exceedingly
complex. 15 Some understanding of them is necessary, however, in order to
understand the jurisdictional problems that they may create.

14. It is important to note here that other anti-avoidance schemes and doctrines that
pierce the corporate veil are less likely to result in jurisdictional conflict. Taxation under
such measures is justified other than by mere stock ownership. For example, foreign company
profits might be taxed because the subsidiary is not in fact resident abroad, due to management of its activities in the taxing country. See, e.g., Unit Constr. Co. v. Bullock, [1960]
A.C. 351. The subsidiary may be doing business in the taxing country through the agency
of its parents. See, e.g., Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Lewellin, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 464
(11L.); Apthorpe v. Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co., 80 L.T.R. (n.s.) 395 (C.A. 1899).
Separate corporate identities may be shown to be mere "sham," with no business purposes,
see, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Haberman Farms, Inc. v. United States,
305 F.2d 787 (8th Cir. 1962); Fillman v. United States, 355 F.2d 632 (Ct. Cl. 1966), or
there may be proof that the shareholder does in fact have 'power to enjoy" the foreign
income. See, e.g., Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970, c. 10, § 478, discussed In Avery
Jones, Anti-Avoidance Measures in the United Kingdom, in TAX HAVENS AND MEASURES
AGAINST TAX EVASION Am AvoimNa IN
nam EEC 54-62 (J. Avery Jones ed. 1974). See also
Vestey v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 136 (Ch.). Legislation aimed at
manipulative "transfer pricing" schemes only reaches income that has not been earned by the
foreign subsidiary at "arms-length." See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482; Income and Corporation Taxes
Act, 1970, c. 10, § 485; CODE GIENPRAL DES Ius6rs [C. GEN. IMPOrs] art. 57 (Fr.); AStG
§ 1 (W. Ger.).
In contrast, accrual basis regimes impose tax solely (and automatically) on the basis of
stock ownership. This results in a jurisdictional overlap much wider in scope and more absolute in nature than under other anti-avoidance measures.
15. The United States' controlled foreign corporations regime has been described as "of
unparalleled complexity, conceptual incoherence and practical difficulties." Tillinghast, United
States Income Taxation of Foreign Source Income: A Survey of the Provisions and Problems,
in Pxocannmins o? THE TWEsNTY-NnrsH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1i 21
(H. Sellin ed. 1971).
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A.

The United States. Regime: "Subpart F'" and the Controlled Foreign
Corporation6
In the years following World War II, many Ameri~an companies
established foreign subsidiaries in countries with little or no income taxation.1 7

American insurance companies were among the greatest offenders in the use
of such "tax havens."

By reinsuring American risks with foreign subsidiaries

in low-tax countries, these companies were able to shift a portion of the
premium income beyond the United States' tax net.

Outside the insurance

industry, so-called "foreign base" companies were used to license patents
and trademarks, or collect and reinvest dividends from foreign operating
subsidiaries. In doing so, they diverted items of income to low-tax countries
that would normally have been realized by the shareholders. To curtail
these manipulations of corporate tax status, the Revenue Act of 196218 imposed a United States tax on certain statutorily designated categories of
"passive" income, such as dividends, interest, and royalties, and on earnings
from sales or services to affiliated companies.' 9
As a result of the Act, every United States citizen, resident, or corporation is required to include in his or its gross income his or its pro rata share
of what is commonly referred to as the "tainted" income of controlled
foreign corporations in which he or it holds a substantial amount of voting
stock.20 A company will be considered a "controlled foreign corporation"
16. Discussion of the constitutionality of Subpart F is beyond the scope of this Article.
The principal issue in this regard is the questionable vitality of the "realization doctrine" of
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). For a treatment of the issue of constitutionality,
see Gabinet & Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept of Income for CorporationShareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 895, 919-31 (1977).
17. See M. LANOER, HOW TO USE FoRemIGN TAX HAVENS (1975); Tillinghast, Current Issues
in the Taxation of Foreign Income, in LEGAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 180, 185-87 (C. Shaw ed. 1962); Note, The Swiss Base Company: Tax Avoidance Device
for Multinationals, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 645 (1975).
18. Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12, 76 Stat. 960. The Act added §§ 951-964 to the Internal
Revenue Code. For a general survey of the controlled foreign corporation regime, see H.
STINmtR & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1110-18 (2d ed. 1976); Langer, Controlled Foreign Corporations-CertainUndistributed Income Taxable to U.S. Shareholders, 50
A.B.A.. 92 (1964); Sloan, Taxation of American Controlled Foreign Earnings Under the Internal Revenue Act Amendments of 1962, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 308 (1963); Tillinghast, supra
note 15, at 1-37.
For a discussion of the history of the American Subpart F, see Sherfy, Background of
General Policy, in TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME BY UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES
227.40 (1966) (symposium conducted by the Tax Institute of America, Dec. 2-3, 1965)
[hereinafter cited as TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME].
19. President Kennedy had originally recommended taxation of all types of foreign income, except that earned in less developed countries. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 provided that shipping income is to be treated as "foreign base company income," taxable
currently to U.S. shareholders. I.R.C. § 954(a)(4). Under provisions of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, income earned in connection with international boycotts and the sum of foreign
bribes and similar illegal payments is also imputable to shareholders. Id. §§ 952(a) (3) (4),
999.
20. Id. §§ 951-964. See generally Tillinghast, supra note 15. For an illustration of the
application of the provisions, see Stock, International Tax Concepts, in TAXATION OF FOREIGN
INCOME, supra note 18, at 189, 195-211.
Provisions relating to "foreign personal holding companies" are not generally of concern
to multinational corporations, since concentrated individual ownership is necessary to constitute
a foreign personal holding company. More than 50% of stock must be owned, directly or
indirectly, by five or fewer individual citizens or residents of the United States. I.R.C. §§ 551556. Tax treatment of foreign source income of foreign corporations will also be affected by

1614

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1609

if more than fifty percent of the total voting power of all stock is controlled
by "United States shareholders." 21 Genuine control, not formal ownership
of shares, is the test. Thus arrangements which place a majority of the
voting stock in hands of foreigners will be disregarded when United States
persons, by express or implied agreement, retain control of the company.22
An individual United States citizen or resident, or a company incorporated in the United States, will be considered a "United States shareholder" if he or it is the beneficial owner,23 directly or indirectly, of at least
ten percent of the total combined voting power of the corporation. 24 Shares
held indirectly through another foreign entity are deemed to be owned by
the ultimate shareholders. 25 Thus an American company may be taxable
with respect to income of lower-tier subsidiaries.
Income of a controlled foreign corporation, whether distributed to its
shareholders or not, will be taxed as a dividend if it falls within the statutorily
designated categories of "Subpart F income." 26 For operating companies,
the most important category of Subpart F income is "foreign base company
income." 27 Includable in the shareholder's gross income as "foreign base
company income" are (1) undistributed passive investment income ("foreign
personal holding company income"), consisting of dividends, interest, royalties, rents, annuities, and gains from the sale or exchange of stock and
securities; 28 (2) undistributed income from transactions within a corporate
group, in which goods are purchased from or sold to, or services are performed for or on behalf of, an affiliated company ("foreign base company
the provisions of id. § 1248, under which gain from liquidation or from sale or exchange
of stock of a controlled foreign corporation will be treated as ordinary income (rather than
long-term capital gain) if the taxpayer owns (directly, indirectly, or constructively) at least
10% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock.
21. I.R.C. § 957(a). A foreign corporation deriving income from insurance of U.S. risks
may be deemed a controlled foreign corporation if only 25% of its voting stock is held by
U.S. persons. Id. § 957(b).
22. The statute defines a controlled foreign corporation as one in which American shareholders own a majority of voting power, not voting stock. Id. § 957(a). The applicable
Treasury Regulations make clear that ownership of the stock does not in itself determine
ownership of the voting power. Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b) (1963) rejects a mechanistic approach to control based on ownership of the equity, and adopts instead an "actual control"
test. See, e.g., Kraus v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'g 59 T.C. 681
(1973); Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911
(1974), aff'g 58 T.C. 423 (1972). For a case where a foreign subsidiary was successfully
"decontrolled," see CCA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 137 (1975), and the commentary
thereon in Liebman, supra note 3.
23. Individuals are considered to own the stock of a spouse, children, grandchildren, and
parents. I.aC. §§ 318(a), 958(b).
24. Id. §§ 951(b), 957(d), 7701(a)(30).
25. Id. § 958(a).
26. So termed because of the Code sections defining it: Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter
N, Part III, Subpart F.
27 I.RC. §§ 951(a) (1), 952(a), 954. Other types of "Subpart F income" include income from insurance of United States risks, id. § 952(a) (1), income from participation in
international boycotts, id. §§ 952(a) (3), 999, and the amount of "illegal bribes, kickbacks or
other payments . . . paid by or on behalf of the corporation . . . to an official, employee or
agent in fact of a government," id. § 952(a)(4). Also imputable to a shareholder, although
not included within the definition of Subpart F income, are foreign earnings reinvested in
United States property. Id. §§ 951(a) (1) (B), 956.
28. Id. §§ 952(a), 954(a) (1), 553, 554.
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sales income") ;29 and (3) undistributed income derived from use of ships
or aircraft in foreign commerce.30 An example of a transaction which gives
rise to Subpart F income is the license by a Swiss company to a French
subsidiary of patents held by the Swiss company's American parent. 3' The
provision counteracts the resulting artificial shifting of profits from the American parent to a foreign jurisdiction where the tax rate is considerably lower.
Income from sales to affiliated companies is not considered "tainted"
when the goods sold are manufactured by the foreign company, or are sold
for use or disposition within the country in which the foreign company is
incorporated.3 2 Nor will services be "tainted" when performed inside the
country of incorporation. 33 A de minimis rule provides that if "tainted"
earnings are less than ten percent of the gross income of the foreign-controlled
corporation, none are taxable as such.34 But if more than seventy percent
of gross income is "tainted," then the entire gross income is treated as
foreign base company income. 35
The operation of the statute can also be avoided if it can be established
that both the creation of the company and the transaction giving rise to the
"tainted" income had, as a principal purpose, something other than tax
avoidance.3 6 Lack of intent to avoid taxation might be established, for example, by a showing that gains from the sale of securities were the result of
sales of second-tier subsidiaries that were forced by the country in which
37
the foreign company is incorporated.
B.

The CanadianRegime: Foreign Accrual Property Income

Corporations and individuals residing in Canada must include in their
taxable income the "participating percentage" of the passive income earned
by "foreign affiliates." 38 Company income attributable to shareholders is
termed "foreign accrual property income" (FAPI), and includes income
"from property . . .and from businesses other than active businesses." 39
The statute does not define "active business," but some "non-active" services
are listed. These include services performed by a foreign affiliate for its
controlling shareholders or related parties when such services are deductible
in computing the taxable income of a Canadian business. 40 This exclusion
29. Id. §§ 952(a), 954(a) (2), (3).
30. Id. §§ 952(a), 954(a) (4). Shipping income was included in foreign base company
income by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 602(d) (1), 89 Stat. 26.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1024, 90 Stat. 1520, excluded from base
company income so-called "same country" shipping from operation of a vessel between two
points within the foreign country in which the vessel is registered. I.R.C. § 954(b) (7).
31. See Note, supra note 17, at 645.
32. I.R.C. § 954(d).
33. Id. § 954(e).
34. Id. § 954(b) (3) (A).
35. Id. §954(b)(3)(B).
36. Id. §954(b) (4).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-1(b) (4) (vii), T.D. 7211, 1972-2 C.B. 453.
38. Canadian Income Tax Act, supra note 8, § 91. See generally Brown, supra note 8.
39. Canadian Income Tax Act, supra note 8,§ 95(1) (b).
40. Id. § 95(2) (b).
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prevents diversion to foreign affiliates of income that would otherwise have
been realized in Canada, such as the insurance of Canadian risks, management fees, and royalties. FAPI is far less extensive than Subpart F income,
and does not include income from services rendered in connection with the
transportation or the purchase or sale of goods. 41
A non-resident company or trust will be considered a "foreign affiliate"
of a Canadian individual or company that owns ten percent or more of the
corporate equity. 42 Income of a foreign affiliate will be imputed to its shareholders only if it is deemed "controlled" by them, "directly or indirectly in
any manner whatsoever." 43 The control which triggers imputation of income may be exercised directly by the taxpayer, by a group of five or less
Canadian residents, or by a related group--resident anywhere in the worldof which the taxpayer is a member.44
The portion of company income imputed to the shareholder will normally
be his or its- "equity percentage" of the foreign affiliate. 45 If any foreign
affiliate has more than one class of shares, however, a "distribution entitlement" must be calculated. 46 This is essentially equal to the amount of increased surplus which would have been paid as a dividend on the relevant
share. 47 No income will be imputed if FAPI is $5000 or less. 48
C. West German Legislation
West Germany's Foreign Tax Law-Aussensteuerreformgesetz-includes
in the taxable income of German residents certain items of income of a
foreign "intermediary company"-Zwischengesellschaft-owned by such residents.49 Zwischengesellschaften include foreign taxable entities of which
more than fifty percent of allotted equity capital or of total voting power is
owned, directly or indirectly, by resident German taxpayers.8 0
A German resident holding any interests in a controlled foreign corporation will be taxed on an allocable percentage of the foreign entity's tainted
income l regardless of the extent of his shareholding. The statute's provisions apply even to individuals with a de minimis equity interest regardless of whether they in fact exercise any control over the corporation. r 2
41. Id. § 95(3).
42. Id. § 95(1)(d).
43. Id. §91(1) (a).
44. Id. § 95(1)(a).
45. Id. §§ 95(1) (e), 95(4) (a), 95(4) (b).
46. Id. § 95(1) (e)(ii) (B); Income Tax Regulations, pt. LIX, reg. 5904.
47. Income Tax Regulations, pt. LIX, reg. 5904 ("Foreign Affiliates"), P.C. 1976-2576,
110 Can. Gaz., pt. 2, at 2970 (1976) (as amended by P.C. 1978-3599, 112 Can. Gaz., pt. 2,
at 4330 (1978)), reprinted in 6 CAN.TAX REP. (CCH) V59,000 at 37,813.
48. Canadian Income Tax Act, supra note 8, § 95(1) (e)(i).

49. AStG §§ 7-14.

50. Id. §7(1).
51. For explanation of the rules for separating active from tainted sales, service, rent,
and royalty income, see Heining, Anti-Avoidance Measures in Germany, in TAX HAVENS AND

MEASURES AGAiNsr TAX EVASION AND AvomIAqca IN THE EEC, supra note 14, at 28; Land-

wehrmann, supra note 9, at 276-78.
52. See Landwehrmann, supra note 9, at 275.
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Earnings are allocated according to the taxpayer's interest in the stated equity
capital of the foreign entity.5 3 If profits are not distributed in proportion to
such equity, or if there is no stated capital, then allocation is made according
to the proportion by which profits are distributed.5 4
In contrast with Subpart F and the Canadian legislation, the German
statute defines income that is not tainted. Unless specifically exempted, income is automatically deemed "intermediate company income" attributable
to German shareholders. Exemptions exist for income from activities such
as manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, banking, insurance, and sales or
services to unaffiliated persons. 55 Most rentals, royalties, interest, and dividends will be considered tainted. 56 "Intermediate company income" will not
be attributed to shareholders if such income is taxed at rates of at least
thirty percent by the jurisdiction in which a corporation has its statutory
seat or central management. 57 For the purpose of determining the effective
foreign tax rate, income may be recomputed in accordance with accounting
principles meeting West German standards. 58
D. Japanese "Anti-Tax Haven Measures"
Under recently enacted Japanese "Anti-Tax Haven Measures" 59 foreign
subsidiary profits may be attributed and taxed to domestic corporate shareholders regardless of the nature of the subsidiary's activity. Unlike the
American, Canadian, and German regimes, there are no categories of
"tainted" income.

The scope of the Japanese measures is limited, how-

ever, to income of subsidiaries with their principal place of business in one
of the tax havens designated by the Ministry of Finance, of which there are
now twenty-seven. The Japanese approach is similar to the German in this
respect, as the latter's regime applies only to subsidiaries with their statutory
seat or central management in "low-tax countries," with an effective tax rate
of less than thirty percent.
Income from a foreign tax-haven subsidiary will be exempt from
accrual basis taxation if the subsidiary has a proper "economic purpose,"
i.e., a business reason to locate in the tax haven. Rules for determining
whether the foreign subsidiary has an economic purpose for locating in the
tax haven vary according to the nature of the corporate activity. Companies
established principally to hold securities and literary or industrial property
53. AStG § 7(1).
54. Id. § 7(6).

55. Id. § 8.

56. See Heining, supra note 51, at 31-32; Landwehrmann, supra note 9, at 276-78.

57. AStG § 8(3). Thus, although income of a Swiss company may be taxed at a rate
of more than 48% to an intervening American shareholder, such earnings are still deemed
tainted income, because the tax is not imposed by Switzerland, the country of the Zwischengesellschaft's statutory seat.
58. Thus deductions and depreciation unknown to German law may not be taken. Id.

§ 10(3).

59. Sozei Tokubetu Sochi-hoo art. 66-6, Diet Statute No. 14 of 1978, described in
OF ANi-TAx HAVEN TAX MEASURES (Foreign
Press Center, Japan, No. R-78-06 1978).
MINIsrTY OF FINANCE, THE INTRODUCTION
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rights, or to engage in finance leasing, are considered ipso facto to lack an
economic purpose for locating in a tax haven. Corporations that are not
principally holding companies may justify the "economic purpose" of their
location on the basis of several criteria. Among these are fixed facilities
(e.g., an office or factory) and management personnel in the tax haven.
A more important criterion is whether the subsidiary's activities are
linked to the economy of the tax haven. Fulfilling a function similar to the
"single country" and manufacturing exceptions in Subpart F, the so-called
"location criterion" is intended to exempt industries such as agriculture,
forestry, fishing, mining, manufacturing, construction, .and the supply of local
services.
The economic purpose for the location of certain statutorily designated
sales and service industries is determined by the relationship between the
foreign subsidiary and the persons to whom the sales are made or services
are rendered. Analogous to the "base company service income" and "base
company sales income" provisions of Subpart F, the "non-related persons
exemption" will remove a tax haven subsidiary from the regime's provisions
if it receives substantial sales and service income from transactions with unrelated parties. Among the industries subject to the "non-related persons
criterion" are banking, wholesaling, insurance, securities brokerage, and shipping or air transport.
Even if a tax haven subsidiary otherwise meets the criteria for exemption from the Anti-Tax Haven Measures, the exemption may be denied if
more than five percent of the subsidiary's income consists of dividends from
a non-exempt foreign subsidiary. This provision is intended to prevent circumvention of the accrual basis regime through manipulation of multiple-tier
corporate structures.
Ownership tests for determining control of the foreign subsidiary track
American Subpart F provisions. Undistributed tax haven income will be
taxed only where Japanese shareholders own directly or indirectly more
than fifty percent of the subsidiary capital, and only shareholders with an
equity interest in the subsidiary of at least ten percent are subject to the tax.

II. EcoNOimic AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF ACCRUAL BASIS TAXATION
Fiscal rivalry is not limited to conflicting assertions of the right to tax.
When a state that has granted tax concessions to attract foreign investment
finds that the concurrent fiscal jurisdiction of the capital-exporting state
vitiates its tax incentives, it may claim the right to decide that income not be
taxed. An extension of accrual basis taxation to all foreign income, as proposed most recently in President Carter's 1978 Tax Program,0 0 increases
60. See note 11 supra.
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the likelihood of jurisdictional conflicts between host states and the capital-

exporting states.0 1
Suppose, for example, that an American manufacturer sets up a factory
in a foreign country that grants manufacturing enterprises a full first year
deduction for all expenditures on new plant facilities, machine tools, and
employee training programs. 62 If the United States then decides to include

foreign manufacturing profits in Subpart F income, the deduction granted
for plant, equipment, and training expenses no longer serves as an incentive.
Because Subpart F income must be computed according to American ac-

counting principles, 63 which of course do not allow the full first year de-

duction granted by the foreign jurisdiction, the United States tax will exceed
the foreign tax allowable as a credit in almost all cases. 64 To prevent repatriation of profits to pay the tax, the foreign country might create exchange
controls, 65 appoint a local trustee for the subsidiary, 66 or impose a confisca61. The lack of protest against accrual basis taxation of tax-haven operations does not
indicate that host states would not object to taxation of income from active manufacturing
enterprises. A tax on a corporation whose only substance is its bank account will have quite
different effects than a tax on a local manufacturing company, especially if the result is failure
to reinvest profits in production facilities which had been expected to provide jobs.
62. For an example of such an allowance, see Finance Act, 1971, c. 68, §§ 40-50, &
sched. 8.
63. I.R.C. § 964(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.164-1, T.D. 6780, 1965-1 C.B. 96. See generally
Bacon, Compliance Problems in Taxation of International Operations,in TAXATION OF Fo REIGN
INcoMES, supra note 18, at 160, 172-73; Weiss, Application of American Accounting Methods
to Foreign Operations: Government Objectives in Setting Up Accounting Requirements, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 981 (H. Sellin
ed. 1965); Rev. Proc. 63-7, 1963-1 C.B. 485, as clarified by Rev. Proc. 75-54, 1975-2, C.B.
594, and amplified by Rev. Proc. 76-35, 1976-2 C.B. 658.
64. Assume a 50% nominal tax rate in country X, applied to $200 of income. If a $100
investment in capital equipment is deductible from income in computing country X tax, such
tax will be $50. But in computing Subpart F income the United States might allow an annual amortization of only 10% of the investment, resulting in a United States tax liability (at
a rate of 46%) of $87, of which only $50 will be offset by a foreign tax credit.
65. Under present American law such action might result in withdrawal of the blocked
profits from income imputable to the shareholder. I.R.C. § 964(b).
66. Such was the French reaction to American exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to
effect its embargo on trade with certain communist countries. Regulations issued under the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-6, 7-39, 41-44 (1970), made illegal
the export of goods to certain communist countries. The regulations applied *to "Americancontrolled" companies incorporated and resident abroad, even as to goods having no connection
with the United States. The conflict between these regulations and the policy of the state of
the foreign corporation's residence is described in Craig, Application of the Trading with the
Enemy Act to Foreign CorporationsOwned by Americans:, Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HIv. L. REv. 579 (1970); and Corcoran, The Trading with the Enemy Act and
the Controlled Canadian Corporation, 14 McGnu. L.J 174 (1968).
Applications of the
regulations to a French company resulted in the celebrated case of Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy. Judgment of May 22, 1965, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1965] Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence
[D.S. Jur.] 147. An English language summary appears in 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 476 (1966).
Fruehauf France, an American-owned company incorporated and carrying on business -in
France, had agreed to sell to a French truck manufacturer equipment for use in tractor-trailer
units. The units were to be resold to communist China. The United States Department of
Commerce, finding the transaction in violation of the Transaction Control Regulations issued
under the Trading with the Enemy Act, ordered the French company's American shareholders
to cause the execution of the contract to be suspended. On application by the subsidiary's
three French directors, the Paris Cour d'appel appointed a judicial administrator to manage
the company. The court noted that the breach of the contract might have resulted in the
loss of jobs of 600 employees, and set the corporate interest, rather than that of the shareholders, as the standard of the directors' duty.
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tory withholding tax on dividends. The issue in such a confrontation is not
whether the foreign country has priority jurisdiction-the right to a "first
bite"-but whether its fiscal competence is exclusive. The law cannot remain neutral; denial of exclusive jurisdiction to the host state renders its
legislation ineffective.
Bilateral income tax conventions to which the United States is a party
provide no resolution of the conflict. On its face the tax under Subpart F
applies only to the American shareholder. Since the savings clauses in most
treaties give the United States the express right to determine the tax liability
of its residents, citizens, and corporations as though the treaty had not come
into effect,67 the operation of Subpart F will generally not be affected.
Such conflicting jurisdictional claims pose complex questions. Perhaps
the most immediately significant of these is the economic effect of accrual
basis taxation, particularly its impact on foreign direct investment. Essentially political considerations of national sovereignty and fiscal fairness are
also important.
A.

The Economic Impact of Accrual Basis Taxation
1. Effects upon the Capital Importer

a. The Effect on Tax Incentives. Capital-importing states frequently
adopt tax incentives to stimulate economic activity, particularly industrial
development.6 8 Developing countries depend heavily on such fiscal incen67. See, e.g., Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Oct. 25, 1956, United StatesAustria, art. XV, para. 1, 8 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. No. 3923; Convention on Double Taxation:
Income, July 9, 1970, United States-Belgium, art. 23, para. 1, 23 U.S.T. 2687, T.I.A.S. No.
7463; Convention on Double Taxation, Mar. 4, 1942, United States-Canada, art. XVII, 56
Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, May 6, 1948, United
States-Denmark, art. XV, para. a, 62 Stat. 1730, T.I.A.S. No. 1854; Convention on Double
Taxation: Income and Property, March 6, 1970, United States-Finland, art. 4, para. 3, 22
U.S.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 7042; Convention on Double Taxation: Income and Property, July 28,
1967, United States-France, art. 22, para. 4, 19 U.S.T. 1580, T.I.A.S. No. 6518; Convention
on Double Taxation: Income, July 22, 1954, United States-West Germany, art. XV, para.
l(a), 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Feb. 20,
1950, United States-Greece, art. IV, para. 1, 5 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 2902; Convention on
Double Taxation: Income, Mar. 30, 1955, United States-Italy, art. XV, para. l(a), 7 U.S.T.
2999, T.I.A.S. No. 3679; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, March 8, 1971, United
States-Japan, art. 4, 23 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7365; Convention on Double Taxation: Income and Property, Dec. 18, 1962, United States-Luxembourg, art. XVI, para. l(a), 15 U.S.T.
2355, T.I.A.S. 5726; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Apr. 29, 1948, United StatesNetherlands, art. XIX, para. 1, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855; Convention on Double
Taxation: Income, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Norway, art. 22, 23 U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S. No.
7474; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Dec. 13, 1946, United States-South Africa,
art. IV, para. 1, 3 U.S.T. 3821, T.I.A.S. No. 2510; Convention on Double Taxation: Income,
Mar. 23, 1939, United States-Sweden, art. IV, para. a, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, art. XV, para.
l(a), 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Jan. 9,
1970, United States-Trinidad and Tobago, art. 4, para. 3, 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 7047;
Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Apr. 16, 1945, United States-United Kingdom, art.
XIII, para. 1, 60 Stat. 1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1546.
68. See generally READINGS ON TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (R. Bird & 0. Oldman eds. 1967) [hereinafter cited as BIRD & OLDIMAN]; J. HELLER & K. KAUFFMAN, TAX INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY IN LEss DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1963) [hereinafter cited as HELLER &
KAUFFMAN]; G. RuaER, PRIVATE FORIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT 125-29 (1973).
See also Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, U.N. Doe. E/4446, at 20-23 (1968);
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fives, which may take the form of tax rate reductions or deductions for the

69
purchase of income producing assets.
Under a "deferral" system, the capital-exporting country does not tax
foreign corporate income until actual distribution of a dividend to the shareholder. The lower rates or special allowances provided by the host country
thus serve as incentives to reinvestment of profits in the country of income
origin. If the shareholder and the company are looked at as one entity, the
tax incentive constitutes an interest-free loan in an amount equal to the
postponed tax of the shareholder's country. 70 In terms of the classic doctrine that the company is an entity distinct from its stockholders, however,
deferral means simply that one person is not taxed on the income of another.
An accrual basis regime would reduce or eliminate the value to the
shareholder of the incentives granted by a host country. Under such a

system, the country where the shareholder resides will tax his net share of

some or all of the corporate profits regardless of whether a dividend is paid.
The tax forgone by the host country will be counterbalanced by the one
The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations,
U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/BSA/6, at 91-94 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Impact of Multinationals]; United States Taxation of Private Investments in Developing Countries, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/126 (1970).
69. See generally HELLER & KAuFFmAN, supra note 68, at 9-11, 57-85, 177-95; G. REuBtR,
supra note 68, at 125-32; Hellawell, United States Income Taxation and Less Developed
Countries, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1393 (1966); Musgrave, International Tax Differentials for
Multinational Corporations: Equity and Efficiency Considerations, in The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, Technical Papers:
Taxation, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/1l, at 43, 48 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Technical Papers:
Taxation]. On tax incentives generally, see S. SusuEY, supra note 6; Surrey, Tax Incentives
as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison With Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 HA~v. L. Rev. 705 (1970). The fruitfulness of such measures has been
questioned. Heller and Kauffman state:
The chief question [of chapter 3 of their study] is whether the disadvantages of
tax incentives, such as their revenue and equity costs and the costs of diverting
scarce administrative talents away from other perhaps more important functions,
are offset by the advantages that the use of tax incentives may afford to a country.
The analysis [of chapter 3] suggests that for most economically less developed
countries they are not.
HELLER & KAUFFmAN, supra note 68, at 9-11.
70. The effect of tax deferral on host country incentives should not be confused with
that of tax "sparing." Treaties for the avoidance of double taxation sometimes contain
clauses, whereby the capital-exporting nation will give tax credit for host state taxes not paid
-thus "spared"--because of host state fiscal incentives. See generally HELLER & KAUFFmAN,
supra note 68, at 74-78; Liebman, A Formula for Tax-Sparing Credits in U.S. Tax Treaties
With Developing Countries, 72 Am. J. INT'L L. 296 (1978); Norr, supra note 1, at 447-48.
For examples of tax sparing clauses, see Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of
Income and Capital, Dec. 23, 1975, West Germany-Tunisia, art. 23(i) (c), [1976] BGB1 U
1927; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Capital, Sune 7,
1972, West Germany-Morocco, art. 23(3), (4), f19741 BGB1 II 22; Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Capital, Feb. 19, 1972, West Germany-Singapore,
art. 23(i)(c), (d), [1973] BGBI II 373.
Tax sparing has never been accepted by the United States. Tax sparing clauses included in United States treaties negotiated with Pakistan and India were never ratified by the
Senate. On American attitudes to tax sparing, see B. BrrrKR & L. EBB, TAXATiON OF FoEisN
INcomE 445-55 (1960); Crockett, "Tax Sparing": A Legend Finally Reaches Print, 11 NAT'L
TAX J. 146 (1958); Surrey, The Pakistan Tax Treaty and "Tax Sparing," 11 NAT'L TAX J. 156
(1958). Tax sparing presents issues substantially different from those raised by deferral. Tax
sparing provisions permanently insulate foreign income from taxation forever. This creates a
temptation to repatriate profits quickly. Deferral, on the other hand, delays repatriation of
profits by encouraging their reinvestment in the country of income source.
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the
imposed by the capital-exporting state. With or71 without tax incentives,
72
foreign enterprise will be taxed at the same rate, if not a greater one.
b. Foreign Investment and National Welfare. Direct foreign investment is generally viewed as a net economic plus for the host country. 7
Among the benefits cited are mobilization of resources,74 more efficient production of goods and services, 75 transfer of technology, 70 the training of indigenous management and technicians, and in some cases a better balance
of payments position by reason of increased exports.7 7 The economic impact of direct investment remains difficult to evaluate, however, because
assumptions about the capacity of local enterprises to develop equivalent
capital, skills, and markets without equity participation by foreign companies
must be made. Could technology be obtained through license arrangements
71. This assumes of course that the capital-exporting state would follow the general prac-

tice among industrialized nations and grant a credit against its tax liability for taxes imposed
by the host state.
On the other hand, the capital-exporting state may allow a deduction from income
rather than grant a credit against tax as a way to give consideration for taxes imposed by the
country of source. A deduction from income reduces the domestic tax only partially by
decreasing the tax base. Use of a deduction would result in some effect for the host country's
incentive legislation. If the foreign corporate income is 100 units, and both host country and
capital-exporting country impose their taxes at a rate of 50%, the global tax burden on the
corporate income will be 75 units, assuming foreign taxes are deductible from income rather
than creditable against tax:
-pre-tax income
100
-less host country tax
50
50
25

-income subject to tax by capitalexporting country
-less tax by capital-exporting country

-net after-tax income
25
A host state tax-incentive which reduces the local effective rate to 10% would reduce the
aggregate tax burden to 55 units.
-pre-tax income
100
-less host country tax
10
90
-

45

-income subject to tax by capitalexporting country
-less tax by capital-exporting
country

-net after-tax income
45
The reduction of the host state tax would therefore still benefit, and presumably attract,
foreign investment.
72. See the discussion of "nominal" and "effective" tax rates in text accompanying notes
200-01 inra.
73. See, e.g., 4 REPORT OF maHROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION 507 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as CAITR REPORT]; R. VERNON, SovERaaNT'Y AT BAY 152-86 (1971); Administrative
Survey, October 1975 to September 1976, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 28 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Administrative Survey).
74. R. VERNON, supra note 73, at 159-61, 170-72.
75. See references cited in R. VERNON, TiE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF

75 n.28 (1972).
76. W.B. REDDAWAY, EFFCrs OF U.K. Drer

MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE

INVESTMENT OVERSEAS

(Interim Report

1967, Final Report 1968) [hereinafter cited as REDDAWAY REPORT] (in collaboration with S.J.
Potter & C.T. Taylor). The Reddaway Report is unique in its firm by firm analysis. It
examines British overseas operations from 1961-1964 in the manufacturing, mining, and plantations industries.
77. See text accompanying notes 87-92 infra.
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without direct investment? Would the productivity of local labor, or the
internal demand patterns for goods and services produced, have been the
same without the foreign ownership? Satisfactoky answers to such questions
are seldom easy. The non-economic consequences of foreign investment are
even more debatable. Culture and ideology imported with capital may conflict with indigenous values. A country might therefore choose to sacrifice
economic growth in order to preserve its own cultural, social, and political
8

traditions and institutions.7
It seems certain, however, that increased accrual basis taxation by
capital exporters will reduce a host state's flexibility in dealing with its
economic problems. Even those nations that choose to restrict importation
of foreign capital usually insist on the right to regulate their own corporate
creatures as they deem proper and desirable. Extension of accrual basis
regimes by capital-exporting states would reduce the effectiveness of one set
of measures-tax incentives-which a host state may believe beneficial to

its economic welfare.
2. Effects upon the Capital Exporter.79 By eliminating or reducing
the effect of lower foreign tax rates, accrual basis taxation may be expected
to discourage capital movement abroad, at least to the extent tax rate differentials affect the investment policies of multinational business enterprises.
Notwithstanding the assertions of many American businessmen, labor
leaders, and politicians,80 evidence on the direct economic effects of overseas
investment on the capital-exporting country is anything but conclusive.
University studies8 of private direct foreign investment have failed to reach
a verdict,8 2 and reports published by the governments of Canada83 and the
United States 4 are equally agnostic.
78. See, e.g., the discussion of Andean foreign investment by Oliver, The Andean Foreign
Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 Am. ".INT'L L 763 (1972).
79. See generally Horst, American Taxation of Multinational Firms, 67 Am. ECON. RV.

376 (1977).
80. See COLMoIA CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 11-16 (statement of

Elizabeth Jager, Senior Economist AFL-CIO); House Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of
Rep. James A. Burke of Massachusetts) (blaming foreign direct investment for "imbalance
of payments and the trade deficit," (id. at 4502), "the devaluation of the dollar, hiking up of
interest rates over here, hiking up of prices, and everything else that goes with it," (id. at
4503), and threatening that "this ballgame [i.e., direct foreign investment] is about to end,"
(id.)); id. at 4453-69, 4762-953 (testimony of others); P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 6; R. VERNON,
supra nte 73, at 209-300. See also 2 CARmR R PORT, supra note 73, at 187-237.
81. P. MusGRAVE, supra note 6; REDDAWAY REPORT, supra note 76; G. RltmER, supra
note 68.
82. On the effect of alternate assumptions, see comments by Oliver Oldman, Professor
of Law and Director of the International Tax Program at Harvard Law School, in his
Foreword to P. MusoRAvE, supra note 6, at vii; R. VERNON, supra note 73, at 186-91; 1.
VERNON, supra note 75, at 70-78.
83. FOREIGN DIRECT INVEsTMENT IN CANADA (1972) (prepared by the government of
OF
Canada for Hon. Herbert Gray, P.C., M.P.); FOREIGN OwNERssm AND THE STRucrUR
CANADIAN INDUSTRY (1968).
84. G. HUPBAUER & F. ADLER, OVERSEAS MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT AND THE BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS (1968) [hereinafter cited as HuFBAuER & ADLER]. FOREIGN INCOME TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 45-59, also takes an agnostic approach toward the effects of
direct foreign investment.
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Resolution of the issue turns principally on whether foreign investment
is a supplement to, or a substitute for, domestic investment, and whether
exports will be encouraged or discouraged by the foreign investment.8 5 The
answer may vary according to the nature of the industry, the firm, the
product, or the service. Assumptions must be made both as to the availability of funds for which there may be no equally profitable domestic use
(for example in the extractive industries such as mining or oil) and as to
the ability of foreign industry to compete with domestic industry in domestic
as well as foreign markets.
Fiscal barriers to transnational investment will not necessarily
increase
domestic investment. An American oil company drilling in Arabia might,
for tax reasons, shift extractive activity to Texas or Alaska. A Dutch oil
company might have trouble making similar domestic investment since its
expertise, technology, and capital might not be as useful in Holland as
abroad. Similarly, it is not certain that the sales of an American manufacturing subsidiary in Ireland, liquidated because of an extension of Subpart F, would be replaced by exports from the United States. A Britishowned competitor might step in. As a further example, assume that only
American industry can produce type X computers. A shift of production
facilities abroad will surely displace exports. If foreign industry develops
a capacity to manufacture similar machines, however, American exports may
decrease in the face of tariff barriers, shipping costs, cheaper foreign labor,
or tax rate differentials.
Foreign direct investment also has significant impacts on the balance
of payments and on labor utilization. Even if the capitalist favors investment because it increases the productivity and income accruing to national
capital, a nation may still wish to prevent investment abroad because it has
an adverse impact on its balance of payments position, or harms an economically discrete group, such as middle-skilled or unskilled workers8 8
a. Effects upon the Balance of Payments. Accrual basis taxation may
improve the national balance of payments account in the short run by discouraging capital movement abroad. However, this would also diminish
foreign earnings whose repatriation would give the capital-exporting state
potential foreign currency claims. In the long run these claims may exceed
the capital investments.87 The net effect will also depend upon the displacement of exports and the rate of repatriation of earnings. The report of the
Cambridge Department of Applied Economics,88 whose terms of reference
gave priority to the effects of overseas investment on the U.K. balance of
payments, 8 9 concluded that adding to the net operating assets of overseas
85. See text accompanying notes 95-96 infra.
86. P. VERNON, supra note 73, at 186.
87. See the statistics discussed in FOanIGN INCOME TASK FORCE R.PORT, supra note 6,
at 47-48.
88. REDDAWAY REPORT, supra note 76.

89. Id. at 348.
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manufacturing subsidiaries would have a positive effect upon the domestic
balance of payments in years after the initial investment. 90 Estimates of the
net return on foreign investments ranged between four percent and two and
one-half percent, varying according to assumptions about the extent to which
the absence of overseas investment would permit a foreign producer to capture the market which would otherwise be held by a U.K. manufacturer. 91
The report's summary of its findings concerning the impact of foreign investment on domestic exports bears quoting, not only for its substantive conclusions, but also to underscore the complexity of the issue:
As far as the effects of the U.K. ownership of the subsidiaries on

these continuing flows of exports are concerned, we concluded that
the effect on input items was certain to be upward, as the non-U.K.

controlled enterprise in the alternative position would have used
less British components, semi-manufacturers, etc. for finished goods;
on the other hand, the effect was normally negative, reflecting the
fact that a company could normally export more of its products
to a market if it had not established local production there, in
spite of the presence of the substitute producer. The latter statement cannot be regarded as a general rule; it is extremely likely
to be true in the case of companies that make consumer goods,

especially those with well-known brand names, but there are cases
where local production seemed fairly definitely to have had an up92
ward effect on parent companies' exports of finished products.

b. Effects upon Labor. Organized labor's opposition to deferral is
based on the expectation that domestic production levels will be preserved
by use of an accrual basis regime that discourages foreign investment. 93
90. Id. at 346.
91. The Reddaway Report assumed that "if British Industry did not establish a producing
unit in the overseas country, then somebody else would." Id. at 209. The two competing
assumptions as to the alternate producer's output were 90% and 100% of the output of the
British company. Id. at 210 n.1.
92. Id. at 103-07, 344. The U.S. Treasury Department study prepared by G.C. Hufbauer and F.M. Adler reached conclusions similar to those of the Cambridge inquiry when
the same basic assumption was made, i.e., that one unit of direct investment makes no net
addition to capital formation in the host country-which the Cambridge analysis called "100%
substitution" of an alternate producer. HUFBAuER & ADLER, supra note 84, at 90-92.
One difference between the findings of the Cambridge inquiry and those of the U.S.
Treasury study relates to the import into the capital exporter of goods manufactured by the
foreign subsidiary. There was no significant trace of import into the U.K. of goods produced
by British overseas subsidiaries. The American study, however, found imports coming from
Canada in the form of processed raw materials, such as newsprint. Id. at 31. The variation
in the findings may have resulted from differences in wage rates, making it attractive for
Americans to buy products manufactured by foreign labor cheaper than their own. See
REDDAWAY REPORT, supra note 76, at 298. Agnosticism is warranted as to the impact of
bringing home the capital, however. In the absence of protective tariff barriers, consumers
in the high-wage country might have purchased the same foreign goods, produced abroad by
the same foreign labor, but by a company owned by foreign rather than domestic capital.
93. See COLUMBIA CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 11-16 (statement of Elizabeth Jager); R. BARNET & R. MULLER, supra note 6, at 319-21; Barovick, Labor Reacts to
Multinationalism, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., July-Aug. 1970, at 40-46; The Times (London),
June 2, 1977, at 2, col. 1 (statements by the British General and Municipal Workers' Union).
The impact will be greatest on the less skilled workers. A product cycle analysis by
Raymond Vernon indicates that American manufacturers tend to move production abroad not
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This assumes that domestic investment opportunities are available and that
domestic management will become more attentive to existing domestic activity. Several commentators have argued coherently that even if direct
foreign investment is a rational use of capital for the capitalist, it is not
necessarily so for the worker.9" If foreign investment has a yield higher
than domestic investment, the greater profit accrues to capital rather than
labor.
Evaluating the effect of foreign direct investment on labor thus raises the
question of what impels domestic manufacturers to set up production facilities abroad 5 Domestic manufacturers may go abroad in order to obtain
access to foreign markets protected by tariff barriers, or in reaction to a
threat by foreign manufacturers to an already established export market.
In either case it is unlikely that accrual basis taxation will safeguard domestic
jobs unless markets in the same or similar product lines are found for displaced domestic production. Liquidation of the foreign subsidiary might
even make matters worse, since beneficial secondary effects of the foreign
production would be eliminated. The subsidiary's purchase of capital equipment or intermediate goods from its parent might be replaced by purchase
of foreign equipment or goods from an affiliate of the foreign manufacturer.
Foreign earnings which had been repatriated as dividends and royalties would
cease, and thus be unavailable for domestic investment. On the other hand,
when production moves abroad, not to retain or obtain markets, but because
lower costs produce higher profit margins for capital, then an accrual basis
regime may have a positive effect on domestic jobs.
The risk of accrual basis taxation is that it may misfire or over-kill.
Although an accrual basis regime may restrict some unwanted foreign investment, it may also discourage shifts of production facilities necessary to
meet foreign competition. Establishment of a foreign subsidiary may actually
generate increased domestic employment as a result of its purchases of
domestic equipment and intermediate goods, the repatriation of its profits,
and the creation of new demands for exports by increasing the prosperity
of trading partners. 96
Transnational investment may have other consequences for labor, perhaps the most important of which is the increased flexibility given to managefor sophisticated innovations, but for older products, where the manufacture's oligopoly is
challenged by foreign competitors. R. VEmoN, supra note 73, at 65-106. Foreign direct
investment may thus actually have an upgrading effect on domestic labor by exporting those
occupations in which innovation is declining.
94. See, e.g., S.SuR=, supra note 6, at 185.
95. For a general survey of the reasons for foreign investment asserted by United States
companies, see R. VERNON, supra note 73, at 71, 72-73 tables 3-5.
96. On this point, see Tillinghast, supra note 17, at 183: "To the extent that the [foreigni
investment would create disposable wealth in the foreign country, that country would be a
better customer for United States exports." Raymond Vernon has referred to the proposition
that "countries that are surrounded by well-to-do neighbors tend to prosper" as "one of the
oldest clich6s in the trade policy business, and one of the most valid." The Economic Consequences of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment, in R. V RNON, supra note 75, at 76.
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ment. When negotiating with union leaders, the multinational company has
the option of putting the factory elsewhereyT However, an accrual basis tax
regime is probably too blunt an instrument to be used in repairing imbalances
in labor-management relations. An increase in government spending to
compensate for the outflow of private capital may be a more appropriate
means to redress the bargaining position of labor.
Attempts to prohibit direct foreign investment should also be considered
in light of retaliatory measures by other governments which would affect
foreign source capital formation.9 8 A disincentive to American production
of abrasives in France or adhesives in Germany might result in increased
production in Minnesota; but it might also eventually result in removal of
Volkswagen production in Pennsylvania or Michelin tire manufacture in
North Carolina.
3. Optimum Allocation of Resources: Barriersor Distorters? Because
nominal and effective tax rates vary among taxing jurisdictions,9 9 barriers to
trans-border investment do not necessarily result in the distortion of such
investment. 100 Distortion occurs when capital moves to less productive locations and uses for reasons other than real (i.e., pre-tax) rate of return. A
manufacturer may move his mill to another state because the labor is more
productive. Or he may do so because taxes are lower. In the former case,
trans-border investment results in greater efficiency; an investment barrier
would be an investment distorter. In the latter case, prohibition or inhibition of trans-border capital movement would check investment distortion.
An accrual basis tax regime would thus discourage investment for reasons
of tax differentials, and to this extent would reduce fiscal investment distortion.
Unfortunately, general conclusions about the economic impact of accrual
basis taxation in this area are difficult. If the investment and its attendant

97. An illustration of the power accruing to a large enterprise from the option to move is
illustrated by the story of the state of Delaware's fight with the late J.P. Getty. When the
Delaware legislature enacted a tax of $.003 per gallon of oil processed at the Getty oil refineries in Delaware City, J.P. Getty responded by threatening to close the refinery. Demonstrations by refinery workers fearful of losing jobs caused the Governor, who had previously
endorsed the tax, to veto the bill. For an account of the incident, see Farnsworth, Tax
Loophole for Multinationals, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1977, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
98. The two-way nature of foreign investment and the prospect of fiscal retaliation is
discussed in 4 CARTER REPORT, supra note 73, at 508, and the REDDAWAY REPORT, supra
note 76, at 339. Concern over the impact of increased foreign direct investment in the
United States led to the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88
Stat. 1450 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78b note (1976)). Prompted in part by the rise in investment funds available to OPEC countries in 1973 and 1974, the Act directed the Department
of Commerce to prepare an analysis of foreign direct investment in the United States. This
directive was renewed and expanded by the International Investment Survey Act of 1976,
22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1976). The report was published in April 1976. BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY Am RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DnEcr INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1976) [hereinafter cited as FDI STUDy], discussed in
Administrative Survey, supra note 73, at 26-29.
99. See text accompanying note 199 infra.
100. On investment distortion, see Musgrave, Tax Preferences, supra note 6, at 206-07;
note 103 infra.
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management and technology cannot be employed as efficiently at home as
abroad, obstacles to the foreign investment may result in a loss of world
production. The subsidiary of a foreign enterprise might be able to run
more productive mines or build better bridges than local rivals.' 0 ' But the
foreign tax levied on the subsidiary's profits might reduce the after-tax yield
to the point where activity would be abandoned to less productive competitors under lighter tax burdens. Depending on the alternate domestic
use to which American capital could be put, the world might be ill-served
by the tax barrier to capital transfers.
The economist's analysis of fiscal distortion of investment is often subsumed under the rubric of tax neutrality. Most economists accept that a
tax system should be "neutral-that is, the flow of investments should not
be distorted by tax considerations. 0 2 From a global perspective, neutrality
is achieved when foreign profits are taxed at the same rate as domestic
profits. Capital would then move in response to rates of return before tax,
since the tax burden would be the same regardless of where investments are
10 4
made. 10 3 Accrual basis taxation comports with such global neutrality.
101. The takeover of a failing American television factory by a Japanese company is a
recent example of this. Warwick Electronics Co., in Forest City, Arkansas, had run into
quality problems, and had reduced its employment rolls from 1000 to fewer than 400. Fear
of impending television import quotas in the United States prompted purchase of the company by the Osaka firm of Sanyo Denki Kabushki Kaisha. Within a year Japanese managers
and technicians raised productivity and sales to the point where employment was at 1300
full-time workers. Int'l Herald Tribune, Sept. 3-4, 1977, at 9, col. 3. See generally R. VBRNoN,
supra note 73, at 161-62.
102. There is less unanimity, however, on exactly what constitutes neutrality. See
generally P. MUsaRAV, supra note 6, at 109-21; Committee on Controlled Foreign Corporations, Tax Section, New York State Bar Ass'n, Comments on Proposals for Legislation to
Change United States Income Taxation of Foreign Manufacturing Operations, 29 TAx LAW.
207 (1976); Hufbauer, A Guide to Law and Policy, in U.S. TAXATION Op AMERicAN BUSINESS
ABRoAD 1-6 (1975); Ture, Taxing Foreign-Source Income, in U.S. TAXATION op AMImcAN
Busnqss ABROAD 37-66 (1975). Ture remarks that the definition of neutrality varies "very
much as Humpty-Dumpty put it to Alice: 'When I use a word, it means just what I choose
it to mean.'" Id. at 38.
103. If the United States imposes a company tax at a 50% rate, and a foreign country
at a 20% rate, a United States corporation benefiting from deferral might have a higher
after-tax yield even if it invests in a less efficient foreign operation. The lack of skilled labor
or an unfortunate geography might result in "real" (before-tax) productivity abroad of 8%,
rather than the 10% which would have been achieved at home. But the after-tax yield from
the less efficient factory would be 6.4%, as contrasted to the 5% net yield from the more
efficient enterprise. Such "tax motivated" foreign investment would result in a loss of world
productivity. Accrual basis taxation would result in an after-tax yield to the foreign investment of only 4% (assuming a foreign tax credit) thus making it worthwhile for the investor
to put his capital in the more productive domestic enterprise.
104. An accrual basis regime will be less effective in allocating capital to investment
opportunities with maximum real yield in the case of an investor resident in a country which
has not "integrated" its corporate and individual tax systems, making no allowance for tax
paid by the company at the time the dividend is taxed in the hands of the shareholder. This
would be the case for an American citizen investing in a manufacturing enterprise located in
a country with no corporate income tax. Under an accrual basis regime, 100 units of investment, with a real pre-tax yield of 8%, will yield the individual American investor in the
70% bracket 2.4 units of after-tax return, assuming that the foreign withholding at source
does not exceed the available United States tax credit. If the individual were to put his
capital into an alternate American corporation, however, his after-tax receipts would be only
1.3 units, since the income has been taxed previously in the hands of the American corporation at the rate of 46%. In order to be more attractive than the foreign investment, the
domestic alternative would have to yield almost twice the foreign pre-tax return.
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Moreover accrual basis taxation would reduce the temptation to fix royalties
for fiscal rather than commercial reasons, 0 5 or to set arbitrary transfer prices
for goods and services between related companies, with a view to shifting
profits to low tax jurisdictions. 1°6
Neutrality, however, also requires that all enterprises in one location
pay the same tax. What has been referred to as "capital-import neutrality" 107
exists if income of an American-controlled company operating in France is
taxed at the same rate as its French-controlled competitor. Optimum use
of host country resources is furthered when local enterprise cqmpetes on an
equal footing with its foreign competitors. Accrual basis taxation clearly
violates this aspect of neutrality. In subjecting the income of the foreigncontrolled enterprise to the additional taxation of the state of its shareholders'
residence,108 a local business is given an advantage which might allow it to
capture markets that would otherwise be held by perhaps more efficient
foreign enterprises.
4. Inter-Nation Allocation of Income. The concept of "inter-nation
equity" concerns the fair apportionment of income between the, capitalexporting and capital-importing nations. 10 9 When a resident of country X
invests in country Y, income from the investment will be lost to country X to
the extent captured by the taxes of country Y. Accrual basis taxation will
increase the gain to the capital-exporting state directly, by augmenting state
revenues, and indirectly, by encouraging profit repatriation. A state that
feels it is not receiving an adequate share of foreign investment income
might thus impose an accrual basis regime to redress the balance.
5. Multiple Taxation Resulting from Exercise of OverlappingJurisdiction by Capital Exporters. Multiple tax burdens may be imposed directly,
105. Assume two subsidiaries: X in country A, with a 50% rate of corporate tax, and Y
in country B, with no corporate tax. If the shareholder's country, with a corporate income
tax rate of 40%, does not tax on an accrual basis, a royalty payment from Y will result in
superfluous tax equal to 40% the amount of the royalty, whereas a royalty payment from X
will result in a decrease in the amount of income subject to tax at the higher (country X)
rate. For a study of the way in which royalty rates may be tax induced, see Kopits, IntraFirm Royalties Crossing Frontiers and Transfer-PricingBehaviour, 86 EcoN. J. 791 (1976).
The difficulty of enforcing "arms length" accounting procedures has been the subject of
discussion and comment by scholars, practitioners, and journalists. At the 29th Congress of
the International Fiscal Association (London, Sept 22-26, 1977) the question was treated by
a panel led by Stanley Surrey and David Tillinghast; the I.F.A. resolution on allocation of
expenses in transactions with related, companies is reprinted in [1975] INTr'L FiscAL Ass'N Y.B.
at 46-54. See generally R. BARNET & R. MULLER, supra note 6, at 157-59; La Mont, Multinational Enterprise, Transfer Pricing, and the 482 Mess, 14 COLUM. . TRANsNAT'L L. 383
(1975). I.R.C. § 482 is the American analogue to § 485 of the British Income and Corporation Taxes Act of 1970 and article 57 of the French Code G6n6ral des Impfts.
106. A domestic corporation that interposes a foreign subsidiary between itself and a
foreign buyer or seller may, through artificial pricing, arrange that the profit from the transaction goes to the subsidiary (not subject to U.S. tax) rather than to the parent. Subjecting
the foreign profits to U.S. tax through an accrual basis regime would defeat the object of
such an exercise.
107. Hufbauer, supra note 102, at 2.
108. See text accompanying notes 194-95 infra.
109. See Musgrave & Musgrave, Inter-Nation Equity, in MODERN Fxca I$sUss 63-85
(P. Bird & J. Head eds. 1972).
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when two nations tax the same person, or indirectly, when the same profit
is included in the taxable income of more than one taxpayer. In the latter
case, there may have been no double taxation in a juridical sense, because
each person is only taxed once. Where the same income has been taxed
more than once, however, there has been double taxation in an economic
sense. Both forms of double taxation constitute barriers to trans-border
capital flows, which may be welcomed or regretted depending on conclusions
as to the net effect of direct foreign investment."i 0
a. Juridical (Direct) Double Taxation. The American citizen resident
abroad will generally be subject to tax on his worldwide income both by the
United States and by his country of residence. Living in Canada or
Germany, the American expatriate may have to include in his income a
portion of the earnings of a "foreign affiliate" (under Canadian legislation)
or a Zwischengesellschaft (under German legislation).
If the foreign entity is organized outside the United States, it may also
be a controlled foreign corporation, whose Subpart F income will be deemed
a dividend to the American expatriate. The undistributed foreign income
will, therefore, be taxed by both the Subpart F provisions and the regime
of the American's residence. A credit for the German or Canadian tax will
normally be allowed to offset the American tax liability as long as the amount
credited does not exceed the U.S. federal income tax which would have been
paid on all of the taxpayer's foreign source profits."' The American credit
will be inapplicable, however, if the FAPI or Zwischengesellschaft income
arises from sources within the United States. This might occur if the foreign
company profits are "effectively connected" with an American trade or
2
business."
If incorporated in the United States, however, the foreign affiliate or
Zwischengesellschaft will not be a controlled foreign corporation under Subpart F. No American tax will be payable until dividend distribution, because domestic companies are treated as separate legal persons for tax purposes." 3 When the dividend is actually paid, the United States will give no
foreign tax credit for amounts paid to Canada or Germany, because the
dividend will be American source income." 4 Relief for the American expatriate will be limited to the credits and deductions granted by German and
Canadian domestic law, and by bilateral treaty provisions applicable to

110. See text accompanying notes 79-106 supra.
111. I.R.C. §§ 901, 904.
112. Id. § 861(a) (2) (B).
113. Exceptions might arise from application of the small business corporation provisions,
allowing shareholders of closely held businesses to elect to be taxed directly on company
profits. Id. §§ 1371-78. The right of election does not exist, however, where more than 20%
of the income is passive investment income. Id. § 1372(e) (5). See generally W. CARY, supra
note 5, at 452-55.
114. A dividend from a United States company will be treated as "income from sources
within the United States" unless more than 80% of the distributing company's gross income
is derived from foreign sources. I.R.C. § 861(a) (2) (A).
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German or Canadian residents.-1 5 If the dividend is paid after the American
returns to the United States, there will be no credit available under Canadian
or German domestic law, or by provisions of the bilateral tax treaties between the United States and Canada or Germany. Not surprisingly, the
case of an American resident asking for credit against Canadian or German
tax on American source income does not seem to have been contemplated.
b.

Economic (Indirect) Double Taxation

(i) Multiple Tier CorporateStructures. When applied to the multiple
tier corporate structure of many transnational enterprises, accrual basis regimes will result in taxation of the same undistributed profits by several
countries. Assume, for example, that a Delaware company owns all shares
of two subsidiaries, one Canadian and one German, and that each subsidiary
in turn owns fifty percent of the capital of a Dutch company. All of the
Dutch income is "tainted" under the American, Canadian, and German
accrual basis regimes, and thus taxable by all three countries. Canada will
not grant a deduction for the American tax, since the parent corporation
clearly is not a "foreign affiliate," none of its stock being owned or controlled by Canadians." 6 Germany will not take into account American tax
liability since its indirect foreign tax credit is granted only in respect of taxes
paid by foreign companies of which at least twenty-five percent of the stated
117
capital is held by the German taxpayer.
Furthermore, the United States will not grant its taxpayers credit for
the Canadian and German taxes on the undistributed Dutch profits. Code
credit provisions relating specifically to Subpart F income make allowance
only for credit as to taxes paid by the entity generating the taxable profits
(the lower-tier subsidiary).118 General foreign tax credit provisions also
permit credit only where there is identity of the company paying the foreign
tax and the company whose earnings are deemed to be distributed to the
taxpayer."1 9 The taxpaying American shareholder must receive or be deemed
to receive a dividend from the corporation subject to the foreign tax. The
Subpart F inclusion is considered a constructive dividend from the lowertier subsidiary; thus the subsidiaries paying the tax (Canadian and German)
20
are not the subsidiaries deemed to distribute the dividendY.
Only if the

115. See German-American Income Tax Treaty, July 22, 1954, United States-German
Federal Republic, art. XV, 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. 3133, amended by Protocol of Sept. 17,
1965, 16 U.S.T. 1875, T.I.A.S. 5920; Canadian-American Income Tax Treaty, Mar. 4, 1942,
arts. XI, XV, 56 Stat. 1399, amended by Conventions of June 12, 1950, 2 U.S.T. 2235,
T.I.A.S. No. 2347, Aug. 8, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1619, T.I.A.S. No. 3916, and Oct. 25, 1966, 18
U.S.T. 3186, T.I.A.S. No. 6415.
American taxes are deductible from Canadian income, not creditable against Canadian tax.
116. Canadian Income Tax Act, supra note 8, §§ 95(1), 113(1).
117. K6rperschaftsteuerreformgesetz [KStG] § 26(2), [1976] BGBI I 2597 (W. Ger.) (subsequent references to the KStG will be to this 1976 Reform Law).
118. I.R.C. §960(a) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1.960-1(c)(ii) (1971).
119. I.R.C. § 902(a).
120. For an example, see Treas. Reg. § 1.960-1 (1971).
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earnings are actually distributed up through the Canadian and German
corporations would a full American credit be available.' 21 Withholding
taxes imposed by Holland, Germany, and Canada at the time of the distributions may not be fully creditable, however, thus adding additional tax
CoStS.1

22

(ii)

Attribution of Earnings to More than One Shareholder. Different

methods for calculating the aliquot share of foreign income attributable to
a shareholder may also result in multiple taxation. One capital-exporting
state may include in the taxable income of its resident a part of the foreign
profits included in the income of a different shareholder resident in another
state.
The problem of inconsistent attribution is illustrated by the following
example. The Canadian legislation, as originally drafted, determined "participating percentage" as the highest percentage of issued stock of any class
held by the taxpayer.12 3 The "pro rata share" of Subpart F income of a controlled foreign corporation, in contrast, is determined by reference to the
amount of tainted income which would have been distributed, directly or indirectly, if all tainted earnings for the taxable year had been paid out with
respect to the shareholder's stock.' 24 If applied to the same situation, FAPI
and Subpart F could result in inconsistent attribution. Let us assume a Dutch
corporation has two classes of stock, with Class A owned entirely by a
Canadian corporation and Class B owned entirely by an American corporation. Under the rules as first drafted, the Canadian "participating percentage" would have been one hundred percent. The American "pro rata
shar&' is fifty percent. Half of the company's income thus would have been
taxed twice, albeit in the hands of two different shareholders. The same
overlap would have occurred if the Canadian's joint venture partner were a
German, rather than an American, company. 125 It would not have been
possible for less than the total amount of income to be imputed to different
shareholders, however. A shareholder's percentage of stock in at least one
class of shares (attributable to the shareholder under the former Canadian
regime) would never have been less than the percentage of total corporate
earnings (attributable to the shareholder under the United States regime).
121. For a fuller discussion of the technical reasons why the entire Dutch profits must
be distributed as a dividend to the American parent, see Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 472,
478-79.
122. Credit with respect to the Dutch withholding tax will not be allowed in Canada
unless the taxpayer has other passive income from within Holland. Canadian Income Tax
Act, supra note 8, §§ 126, 127.
123. Id. §§ 95(1)(c), 95(4)(a), 95(5) (as in effect on Jan. 1, 1973). Shares were deemed
to be of the same class if the rights and obligations attached thereto were identical. Voting
power was not considered in determining whether rights were identical. This somewhat odd
rule reduced tax avoidance through use of separate classes of stock receiving benefits disproportionate to voting power.
124. I.R.C. § 951(a) (2).
125. German legislation normally will impute foreign income to German residents according to the portion of stated equity held. If stated equity capital does not truly represent the
aliquot portion of the shareholder's earnings, the tainted income is imputed to the shareholder
according to the proportion in which profits would be distributed. AStG § 7(6).
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United States tax principles would allow no credit for any taxes paid
by the Canadian or German shareholder in the above example. A parent
corporation may claim credit only for taxes paid by its subsidiaries, not by
a third company in respect of the subsidiary's profits. 126 For similar reasons
no credit against tax will be given by West Germany 127 nor will a deduction
from income be allowed by Canada 28 for tax paid on the overlap portion
of income.
The Canadian legislation has been amended so that the "participating
percentage" should roughly approximate the German and American concepts of income imputable to a shareholder. When the relevant foreign
affiliates have more than one class of shares, "participating percentages"
will be based upon the shareholder's "distributive entitlement," which is
essentially the amount of the affiliate's net current surplus which would be
29
paid out in a hypothetical distribution.
c. Lowering Investment Barriers. Both juridical and economic double
taxation constitute barriers to transnational investment. Jurisdictional overlap thus indirectly inhibits the rationalization of global productive forces and
the distribution of skills and technology to less developed areas. The multidirectional flow of capital among developed economies constitutes an additional argument against fiscal barriers among capital exporters. An obstacle
to outward movement of capital might captur& some of it for domestic investment, but the response of the state's trading partners might reduce the
inward flow of foreign funds. Disincentives to trans-border capital movement might also reduce the number of potential entrepreneurs capable of
exploiting wealth-creating opportunities. An American failure in an industrial
or commercial venture might be reversed by know-how contributed by
Canadian or German participation. An allocation of taxing competence
among capital-exporting states should be made with a view to reducing fiscal
barriers to transnational capital flow. A formula for such allocation is pro30
posed later in this Article.
B.

The PoliticalImpact of Accrual Basis Taxation: National Economic
Sovereignty

The economic impact of a tax system may impinge upon what a state
perceives to be its rights as a nation. Consequently, economic issues of
accrual basis taxation can be expected to present themselves in political
terms, typically focusing on the somewhat elusive concept of "sovereignty."
Sovereignty has been described as "the right to exercise (in regard to a
126. I.R.C. § 902.
127. KStG § 26(2) (W. Ger.).
128. A deduction will be granted only for taxes paid by a foreign affiliate of the taxpayer.
Canadian Income Tax Act, supra note 8, § 113(1).
129. Income Tax Regulations, pt. LIX ("Foreign Affiliates"), P.C. 1976-2576, 110 Can.
Gaz., pt. 2, at 2964 (1976) (as amended by P.C. 1978-3599, 112 Can. Gaz., pt. 2, at 4330
(1978)), reprinted in 6 CAN. TAx REP. (CCH) 59,000, at 37,808.
130. See text accompanying notes 269-72 infra.
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portion of the globe) to the exclusion of any other state the functions of
a state." 131 The "functions of a state" include the regulation of territorial
economic activity. 132 A strict view may regard the right to do so as "without regard to the effect of such regulations upon [the state's] neighbours." 133
An essential aspect of sovereignty for a host state is the right to determine the reinvestment of profits by its corporate creatures which operate
within its borders. The same concept of sovereignty, however, gives the
capital-exporting state the right to tax its residents. Although the tax imposed by the capital-exporting state interferes with economic activity within
territory over which the host state is sovereign, any limitation on this taxing
power is an interference with the capital exporter's own sovereign right to
command its residents. 13 4
The political impact of ending deferral will be explored principally
in terms of host state reactions to the attempts of capital exporting states
to control foreign corporate conduct in non-fiscal areas. Because extraterritorial jurisdiction is more easily justified when exercised over a state's
own nationals, consideration will also be given to the national character of
corporations. Finally, mention will be made of problems arising from the
special character of the interdependence existing between capital exporters
and capital importers.
1. The Affront to Sovereignty. Exercise of overlapping jurisdiction
may be seen in a number of areas of United States legislation besides taxation.
American legislation and regulation have attempted to shape the conduct of
foreign companies in the important areas of antitrust law, 35 trade with
communist countries, 3 6 and the reinvestment of profits of American-owned
companies. 137 These domains provide an indication of the potential responses of host states to an accrual basis regime that taxes industrial income.
131. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
132. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (discussing the
validity of a state tax on a federally chartered bank); Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France
v. United Kingdom), [1953] I.CJ. 47 (concerning state functions exercised by the English

Crown over a group of islands between the Channel Islands and the Normandy coast).
133. See J. BRInPLY, THE LAW OF NATIONs 47 (6th ed. 1963) (quoting COMMISSION TO
STUDY THE ORGANIZATION

OF PEACE, PRELIMINARLY REPORT AND MONOGRAPHS,

reprinted in

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIAION No. 369, at 200 (1941)).
134. The conflict raises issues akin to those presented to the Supreme Court in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The Court was required to pass upon the
validity of a Maryland tax on a bank incorporated by the federal government and doing
business in Maryland through a branch. Chief Justice Marshall affirmed the power of a state
to tax subjects over which its sovereignty extends. Id. at 429. Nevertheless his opinion held
Maryland tax invalid because it burdened the federal sovereignty in its exercise of the power
to incorporate banks.
135. See K. BREWSrER, ANTrrRusr AND AMEPaCAN BusiNEss ABROAD (1958).
136. See Corcoran, supra note 66; Craig, supra note 66.
137. Although the commands were aimed at United States persons, the restraints affected
income earned and retained by foreign companies. The controls were imposed on January 1,
1968, by Exec. Order No, 11,387, 33 Fed. Reg. 47 (1968), authorized by § 5(b) of the 1917
Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976) (as amended). For a discussion
of the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations, see Lancaster, The Foreign Direct Investment
Regulations. A Look at Ad Hoc Rulemaking, 55 VA. L. Rav. 83 (1969); Willey, Direct Investment Controls and the Balance of Payments, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 95-119
(C.P. Kindieberger ed. 1970).
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Both individually and collectively, states express sensitivity to foreign
incursions into regulation of internal economic activity. 13 The developing
countries have been particularly vigorous in their pronouncements against
perceived vestiges of "alien and colonial domination." 139 Two United
Nations resolutions on this subject are particularly noteworthy. The 1962
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 140 declares that

"the import of foreign capital required [for the exploitation of natural resources] should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the

[host] peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with
regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities." 141
The resolution continues: "In cases where authorization is granted, the
capital imported and the earnings on that capital shall be governed by the

terms thereof, by the national legislation in force, and by international law."
No mention is made of the legislation of the capital-exporting state.

142

The

1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order143 declares the "[flull permanent sovereignty of every State over ...
all economic activities" to be one of the principles upon which the new
economic order should be founded.144 The Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, 14 5 prepared in conjunction with the Programme of Action
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,1 46 affirms
138. Scholarly descriptions of reactions by foreign governments to the extraterritorial application of American law includ6 J. BFuaMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTs AND THE MULTi-NATIONAL
ENTERPRSE (1970) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL INTEREsTs]; J. BERmAN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss AND GovERNmENTs (1971); K. BREwsTER, supra note 135, at 45-51; R.
VERNON, supra note 75, at 113-17, 179-81, 193-96; R. VERNON, supra note 73, at 232-41, 277-81;
Corcoran, supra note 66; Craig, supra note 66; Rubin, The International Firm and National
Jurisdiction,in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 137, at 190-95.
For an opinion that conflicts of overlapping jurisdiction are not really a cause for worry,
see R. VERNON, supra note 75, at 17 ("Conflicts . . . in fields such as antitrust or trading
with the enemy or securities regulation, can be handled reasonably well as nations grow more
sensitive to the problem."); cf. Rubin, supra, at 195 ("At least in this important field of antitrust, I am therefore inclined to feel that the international firm presents no real threat to
comity between the nations.").
139. See Preamble to the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6th Spec. Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doe.
A/9559 (1974). Pronouncements by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development are also pertinent. See also Coonrod, The United Nations' Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 273, 274 n.4, 297 n.125 (1977); Joelson, The
Proposed International Codes of Conduct as Related to Restrictive Business Practices, 8 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 837 (1976).
140. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962),
reprinted in I. BRowNL E, BAsIc DocummNTs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 141-43 (2d ed. 1972).
141. Id. art. 1(2).
142. Id. art. 1(3).
143. G.A. Res. 3201, 6th Spec. Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doe. A/9559
(1974).
144. Id. art. 4(e).
145. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974),
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEOAL MAT'LS 251 (1975). The Charter was adopted at the 29th Session
of the*U.N. General Assembly, on December 12, 1974, by a vote of 120-6, with 10 abstentions.
Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany
cast negative votes. Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Spain abstained. For a commentary on the Charter, see Brower & Tepe, The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International
LAv?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295 (1975).
146. G.A. Res. 3202, 6th Spec. Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doe. A/9559
(1974).

1636

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1609

that each state has the right "[t]o regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws
and regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and
priorities." 147
Remonstrances to American regulation of foreign investment have also
come from Canada, one of the United States' closest allies and most important trading partners. The Canadian 'government's 1972 report on foreign direct investment in Canada explored the impact in Canada of the
extraterritorial effects of the United States' securities regulation, antitrust
law, balance of payments regulations, and anti-Communist embargo. 148 The
report concluded that the extraterritorial effect of American legislation represented "an intrusion of foreign law and foreign government policy into
Canada and in that sense constituted a challenge to Canadian sovereignty." 149
Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to French'5 0 and
Canadian' 5' corporations controlled by Americans has aroused foreign objections even though the legislation was enforced by sanctions only against
American citizens, residents, or corporations. Foreign governments have
reacted similarly to investment controls enforced through exercise of jurisdiction only over the American shareholder. The Foreign Direct Investment
Regulations 52 put mandatory limits on the reinvestment of overseas earnings
of American-owned foreign companies. 153 Although the regulations were
not applicable to investment in Canada, a Quebec minister commented on
the repatriation of earnings which had been requested under the voluntary
restraint program imposed in 1965:
[I]f the United States government now determines what these companies shall do for reasons other than profit-making-if, as Mr.
Fowler [then Secretary of Treasury] says, they are to play a significant role in U.S. foreign policy-then we have a new problem.
I say the United States is interfering in our internal affairs. 154
147. Id. ch. U1,art. 2(a).
148. FOREIGN DIRECT INvEsrmmNT IN CANADA, supra note 83, at 253-307.

149. Id. at 428.
Five years earlier a task force on foreign ownership of Canadian industry had articulated
the same resentment:
It is necessary, if Canada's sovereignty is not to be eroded and its national independence diminished, that positive steps be taken to block the intrusion into Canada
of United States law and policy applicable to American-owned subsidiaries with
respect to freedom to export to Communist countries, anti-trust law and policy, and
balance of payments policy.
FORRION OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN

INDUsTRY, supra note 83, at 407.

150. See Craig, supra note 66.
151. See Corcoran, supra note 66.
152. 33 Fed. Reg. 49 (1968) (revoked by 41 Fed. Reg. 50,807 (1976)).
153. See generally J. BRHRmAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS, supra note 138, at 93-98; Rebbinder,
The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A European Legal Point of Miew, 34 LAW &
CoNTEmp. PRoas. 95, 96-97 (1969). The controls were imposed by Exec. Order No. 11,387,
33 Fed. Reg. 47 (1968). See note 137 supra.
154. Cited in J. BEnRmAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS, supra note 138, at 95.
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Negative European reaction came only from Spain and France, most probably because of international concern over the American balance of payments
deficit, which the regulations attempted to cure. 55
The affront to sovereignty resulting from an extension of accrual basis
taxation would be not unlike that resulting from foreign direct investment
controls. Commands given to the domestic shareholder might cause the
foreign corporation to distribute profits as a dividend, rather than reinvest
them in corporate activity. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
the capital-exporting state would thus thwart the host state policy for the
economic growth of its corporate creatures.
An accrual basis regime applicable to industrial income may conflict
with the law as well as the policy of the host country. Local company
law may require directors to exercise their business judgment for the welfare
and growth of the corporate entity, rather than to comply with foreign
legislation applicable to the majority shareholders. The directors' and the
majority shareholders' fiduciary duty to the subsidiary, and principles setting
standards for dividend distribution, could conflict with a shareholder's need
to repatriate profits to pay taxes to his state of residence. Under German
law, for example, excessive dividends may constitute a breach of the duty of
the board of directors of the stock corporation-Aktiengesellschaft-toreinvest profits for corporate growth. 156 Similarly, the shareholders of a
French socigtg anonyme conceivably might be subject to an action for abus
de droit in forcing a distribution of profits excessive in light of enterprise
157
needs.
Host states, then, may be expected to resent foreign taxation of the
income of local industries, particularly when such taxation vitiates host state
attempts to encourage reinvestment of local earnings. Because such reinvestment will affect the exploitation of local resources and labor, it would
not be surprising for host states to view any extension of accrual basis taxation as a further interference with their economic sovereignty.
155. See J. BEHRmAN, NATiONAL INTERES, supra note 138, at 93.
156. Rehbinder, supra note 153, at 101-06.
157. See Saint, France: Stockholder Protection, 9 AM. J. Coux. L. 693 (1960); Loi No.
66-537, art. 360, 19661 J. 0. July 26, Journal-classeur p6riodique [J.C.P.] M No. 32 197
(Fr.). Article 360 permits the nullification of corporate acts that are in violation of general
contract law. Under French law, a corporation represents a contract among the shareholders
and it is regarded as a breach of this contract for a shareholder to vote his shares for his
personal, rather than the collective, interest.
Applied to corporations, abus de droit is sometimes referred to as abus de majoritM. French
courts have considered application of the abus de droit doctrine to nullify the decision of a
majority of shareholders to carry forward large profits as reserves without declaring a dividend.
In Judgment of Apr. 18, 1961, Cass. civ. com., [1961] Dalloz, Jurisprudence [D. Jur.] 661,
J.C.P. II No. 12164 (Fr.), the court reversed the lower court decision, Judgment of Feb. 28,
1959, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1959] D. Jur. 353, in favor of the minority, on the grounds that
it had not been proved that the majority had in fact acted contrary to the general interest of
the company in order to favor themselves at the expense of the minority.
See also Loi No. 66-537, art. 437, [1966] J.0. July 26, J.C.P. I No. 32197 (Fr.) (imposing penal sanctions on directors who vote for a proposal contrary to the interests of the
company).
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2. The National Characterof Companies. Although fiscal jurisdiction
under accrual basis regimes rests on the taxing state's link with the shareholder, the foreign corporation itself is taxed indirectly. The affront to host
state sovereignty becomes even more direct if the taxed subsidiary is deemed
a national of the host state. The principles of public international law for
determining the nationality of a corporate entity are anything but settled,
however. 158 The various criteria employed include country of incorporation, 159 location of registered head office, 10 nationality of ownership, 01' and
place of control of management. 6 2 For tax purposes the United States looks
to place of incorporation, 0 3 the United Kingdom looks to place of central
management and control,' 64 and continental countries usually look to the
corporate seat (siege social), which is either the place of central management
or the principal place of business.' 65
The United States has asserted that corporations controlled by its
citizens are American nationals in war damage cases'0 0 and in cases of
foreign expropriation of property without compensation. 16 The embargo
on trade with certain communist countries, under the Trading with the
Enemy Act,16 8 went significantly further by extending not only diplomatic
protection but also legislative jurisdiction0 9 to any American-owned "cor158. See generally Compagnie Financi~re de Suez v. United States, 492 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl.
1974); 1 C. PARRY, NATIONALITY

AND

CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 133-42

(1957); Craig, supra note 66, at 589-92; Hadari, supra note 2, at 23-24.
159. RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 3, § 27; I.R.C. § 7701 (a) (4). Compagnie Financibro
de Suez v. United States, 492 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1974), held that the Suez Canal Company
was not entitled to the benefit of the preferential withholding rate on dividends under the
France-United States Income Tax Convention. The Company was deemed an Egyptian enterprise despite the fact that its management and capital were predominantly French, and its
administrative officers were in France. The company had been created by the sovereign
authority of the Turkish Viceroy of Egypt and its "designated head office" was in Cairo.
160. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, art. 58, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958); 1 H. BATIFPOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRivft 260-61
(6th ed. 1974); R. RODIhREE, DRorr COMMmRcIAL: GROUPEMENTS COMMERcuuX 28-31 (1977).
161. See, e.g., Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co., [1916] 2 A.C. 307 (H.L.)
(House of Lords refused to allow a company incorporated in England to sue to recover a
debt. Since all except one of the shares of the company were held by German residents, the
company was regarded as an enemy alien, rendering the commercial transaction itself illegal
and payment unenforceable.); Delagoa Bay Railway Company Case, 5 BIUT. Din. OF INT'L L.
535 (1965) (American and British diplomatic intervention, in 1889, on behalf of a Portuguese
company. The intervention was justified because the injured company was incorporated in
the respondent state, and would have as a practical mater been without remedy had the
shareholders' states not acted.).
162. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970, c. 10, § 482(7); De Beers Consol. Mines,
Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] A.C. 455.

See generally 5 HACKWORTH, DIoEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

840-44 (1943); Kronstein, The Nationality of International Enterprises, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
983, 987 (1952).
Place of control may be different from place of registered head office (siege social) when
the latter is merely a matter of form. Control and residence have overlapped as tests in
U.K. taxation. See, e.g., Unit Constr. Co. v. Bullock, [1960] A.C. 351.
163. I.R.C. § 7701(a) (4).
164. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970, c. 10, § 482(7).
165. See Hadari, supra note 2, at 7-11.
166. 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 84044 (1943).
167. See Kronstein, supra note 162, at 987.
168. See generally note 66 supra.
169. Legislative jurisdiction, as distinguished from enforcement jurisdiction, is the capacity
of a state to prescribe a rule of law. See RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 3, § 6; F. MANN,
supra note 2, at 3; Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,78 COLUM. L REv. 1587 (1978).
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poration . . . wheresoever organized," even in respect of extraterritorial

activity.170 This approach may be analogous to the jus sanguinis principle
whereby nationality of natural persons is based upon descent. In the Barce-

lona Traction case,1l7 however, the International Court of Justice took a
narrower view of the question.

In considering diplomatic protection of

corporate entities, it was unwilling to look beyond the state of incorporation
or of registered head office.

The proposition that the shareholders' state

might grant diplomatic protection to the corporate entity was rejected as
likely to create "an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity in international

economic relations." 172
Resolution of jurisdictional conflicts might be furthered by analogy to
the status of dual nationals, with allegiance to both the jus soli and the jus
sanguinis. An order of precedence between the relevant nationalities has
been established in the area of state responsibility for injury to aliens, where
persons with ties to both the protecting and the respondent states are allocated the state of "dominant" nationality. In the Mergg Claim, 73s the
Italian-American Conciliation Commission refused to allow the United States
to assert the claim of one of its nationals for property lost in the Second

World War. The claimant individual, a woman born in the United States
and resident there until the age of twenty-four, acquired Italian nationality
upon marriage to an Italian. She thereafter lived abroad. The Commission
held that the United States could not assert the claim of Mrs. Merg6 against
Italy because she was not "dominantly a United States national." 174 Mrs.

family life had given her a "closer and
Merges economic, social, civic, and
75
Italy.
with
bond
effective"
more
A similar principle is echoed in certain treaties to avoid the double
imposition of income tax which, although not yet evidence of emergent cus170. Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§500.329(a)(4), 500.330(a)(4)
(1978).
171. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [1970] I.CJ. 3.
172. Id. at 49.
The Court rejected application of the principle applied in an earlier case, which required
only a showing of genuine connection between the injured claimant and the protecting state.
The Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [19551 I.C.J. 4. Even if the "genuine
connection" test were applied to corporate entities, the claim of the state of incorporation
would seem to be affected only in the case of sham corporations set up in tax-haven
jurisdictions.
In the case of pure tax-haven operations (such as collecting capital gains or reinsuring American risks) the absence of significant activity in, or contact with, the country of
corporate residence or incorporation would usually justify a presumption that the company
lacks economic reality. The argument is less persuasive as to "base companies," which serve
a legitimate business purpose for the overseas operations of a multinational enterprise: providing services, making sales, or licensing. patents, trademarks, and know-how. In these cases
the company has a genuine economic function, and the argument for attribution of earnings
to the parent shareholder is more pragmatic: the activity could easily have been carried out
by a branch of the parent (there would be no tariff barriers or competition from local manufacturers militating for incorporation of a local subsidiary), in which case the state of parent's
residence or incorporation would have taxed the profits.
173. United States v. Italy, 22 I.L.R. 443 (Italian-American Conciliation Comm'n 1955).
174. Id. at 456-57.
175. Id. at 455.
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tomary law,176 also express priorities and values of the international community. As to individuals subject to concurrent fiscal jurisdiction, many
treaties recognize the superiority of claims of the state with links to the taxpayer based on "closest economic relations." 177
Jurisdictional restraint in deference to "effective nationality" was also
shown by the United States Supreme Court in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy.17 8 A statute prohibiting trade between the United States and
France provided that any vessel engaged in trade with France would be
forfeited if owned by a resident of the United States or "any citizen . . .
thereof resident elsewhere." 179 The owner of the vessel in question, although born an American citizen, had lived abroad since childhood and
had taken an oath of allegiance to Denmark. Without deciding that the
individual had lost American nationality, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned
that the vessel was immune from forfeiture because the statute would not
apply to an American citizen who had acquired the commercial privileges of
a foreign domicile. 180
The principle of the Mergg Claim and Schooner Charming Betsy decisions might be extended to the field of transnational corporate taxation. The
host state can be expected to have a "closer and more effective bond" with
the local industrial company than does the capital-exporting state.1 8' The
corporation would normally use host state labor and benefit from host state
services and protection, where it carries on its principal activity. Exclusive
fiscal competence would therefore be allocated to the host state, and the
capital exporter would be prohibited from taxing its shareholders on undistributed profits of the foreign companies in which they have an interest.
3. Host State Perceptions of Economic Interdependence. A relationship between economic interdependence and reduction of international con176. On the use of bilateral treaties as evidence of emerging rules of international law,
see the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (West Germany v. Denmark; West Germany v.
Netherlands), [19691 I.C.3. 3. See generally Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946, Int'l Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg) (discussing the effect on international law of the 1928 Kellog-Briand Pact
for the Renunciation of War), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 216-21 (1947); I.
BRowNUE, PRiNciPLEs OF PuBLic INTERNAnoNAL LAw 13 (2d ed. 1973); Fitzmaurice, Some
Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 153,
157-60 (1958), reprinted in D. HARIus, CASES

AND

MATERM S

ON

INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-43

(1973).
177. See, e.g., Convention on Double Taxation: Income, July 9, 1970, United StatesBelgium, art. 4(2) (a), 23 U.S.T. 2689, T.I.A.S. No. 7463; Convention on Double Taxation:
Income and Property, Mar. 6 1970, United States-Finland, art. 3(3), 22 U.E.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No.
7042; Convention on Double Taxation: Income and Property, July 28, 1967, United StatesFrance, art. 3(3), 19 U.S.T. 5820, T.I.A.S. No. 6518; Convention on Double Taxation: Income and Capital, May 7, 1975, United States-Iceland, art. 3(2)(b), 26 U.S.T. 2004, T.I.A.S.
No. 8151; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Mar. 8, 1971, United States-Japan, art.
3(3), 23 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7365; Convention on Double Taxation: Income and
Property, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Norway, art. 3(2), 23 U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S. No. 7474.
178. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
179. Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10, § 1, 2 Stat. 7.
180. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 120.
181. The American practice of taxing its nonresident citizens is of limited relevance to
issues raised by taxation of foreign corporations. Exercise of jurisdiction over expatriate
citizens generally raises no issues of vital national interest for the state of residence, since
there is generally limited reinvestment of individual earnings in local business.
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ffict has been asserted throughout much of this century. 8 2 One aspect of
the pro-interdependence hypothesis has been the belief "that increasing the

volume of shared transactions and common tasks can erode hostility."183
Interdependence does not necessarily mean equal dependence, however. When
the dependence among nations is lopsided, a potential conflict may spring
from feelings of insecurity.

Developing nations which fear loss of autonomy

and erosion of self-identity may perceive interdependence as a euphemism
for "neo-colonialism." 184 The advanced economies of Europe, themselves
capital exporters receiving direct foreign investment, have also manifested
sensitivity to technological dependence on and industrial domination by the
United States. 8 5 The energy crisis, dramatized by the Arab oil embargo
during the winter of 1973-74, and the influx of foreign investment into the
United States have raised even American awareness of the dangers of asym86

metrical interdependence.
Limiting the contexts where private investment becomes a visible
battleground for conflicting policies and laws would reduce perceptions of
dependence and the tensions they create. This end would clearly be served
by allocating to the host state exclusive fiscal competence over undistributed

industrial profits earned by its corporate creatures.

87

182. This view is not shared by all. One writer has stated:
But close interdependence . . . raises the prospect of at least occasional conflict.
The fiercest civil wars and the bloodiest international ones have been fought within
arenas populated by highly similar people whose affairs had become quite closely knit
together. It is hard to get a war going unless the potential participants are somehow closely linked. Interdependent states whose relations remain unregulated must
experience conflict and will occasionally fall into violence. If regulation is hard to
come by, as it is in the relations of states, then it would seem to follow that a
lessening of interdependence is desirable.
Waltz, The Myth of National Interdependence, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra
note 137, at 205.
183. Bloomfield, Toward a Strategy of Interdependence, in DEP'? oF STATE SPECtAL REPORT No. 17, at 8 (July 1975). The Special Report is an edited version of chapters I and III
of volume 1 of H. ALKER, JR., L. BLOOMFIELD, & N. CHOJcRi, ANALYZING GLOBAL INTERDEPENDEN E (M.I.T. Center for Int'l Studies n.d.).
In this regard, former U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated that "if goods can't
cross borders, armies wil"
Quoted in Gardner, The Hard Road to World Order, 52 FOREIGN
AFF. 556, 567-68 (1974). Similarly, President Nixon contemplated a "network of relationships
and interdependencies ... that take the profit out of war." Quoted in Bloomfield, supra, at 7.
184. U.N. Doc. A/9553, Apr. 25, 1974, cited in Bloomfield, supra note 183, at nA0.
185. See generally J. BEHPRMAN, NATIONAL INTERE Ts, supra note 138, at 32-84; R.
VERNON, supra note 73, at 167-70. Concerning the Canadian experience, see FOREIGN OwvaNSHIP AND Tm STRuCTURE OF CANADIAN INDusTRY, supra note 83; FOREIGN DIRCT INVESTMENT IN CANADA, supra note 83; K. LEvn,
SmLENr SURENDER: THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION IN CANADA (1970).
186. See 1974 Foreign Investment Study Act, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) note (1976)); 1976 International Investment Survey Act, Pub. L. No.
94-472, 90 Stat. 2059 (1977) (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-08 (West Supp. 1978)), discussed in Administrative Survey, supra note 73, at 26-30.
187. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, in Impact of Multinationals, supra note 68, at 50, recommended that home and host countries explore the
possibility of concluding treaties to regulate extraterritorial application of home country
legislation.
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EFFECTS OF ACCRUAL BASIS TAXATION ON THE TAXPAYER:
HORIZONTAL EQUITY AND RELEVANT WEALTH

Similarly situated persons should pay substantially similar taxes. This
principle, often referred to as "horizontal equity," requires that a similar tax
be imposed on similar amounts of income. Equity might be sought according to an international standard, taking into account foreign as well as
domestic taxes, or in a national context, treating foreign taxes only as expenses deductible from income. 188
Application of the principle of horizontal equity raises the question of
who or what is the relevant taxpayer. Tax law may follow the doctrine
that a corporate body is an entity distinct from its shareholders. Or equity
may be sought for the affiliated enterprises viewed as a whole. The fairness
of taxing company and shareholder as a single economic entity may depend
on the degree of control exercised by the shareholder.

A.

The Shareholderas Taxpayer
Similar treatment of similarly situated taxpayers requires that the
criteria applied for lifting the veil between shareholder and corporation be
the same in the case of both domestic and foreign entities. Deferral does
not breach this standard. The shareholder is taxed only when he or it
actually receives a dividend, whether from a domestic or a foreign entity.
The corporate veil of the domestic or the foreign company will be pierced
only when judicially or statutorily defined abuses have occurred. 8 9
This standard of equity is breached, however, by the so-called "indirect" foreign tax credit, 90 by which foreign taxes paid by a foreign company may be applied against the United States tax liability of the American
shareholder. It is inconsistent to treat the company as a separate legal entity while allowing the shareholder credit for taxes paid by the company.
In other ways the shareholder of the foreign company is at a comparative disadvantage, however. The accounts of a foreign subsidiary may not
be consolidated with those of the parent; thus the parent may not offset its
gains against foreign losses.'9 1 Moreover, the eighty-five percent deduction
for dividends received by one domestic company from another is not allowed
with respect to dividends from a foreign subsidiary. 92 Nor does the credit
against tax for investment in production or research facilities apply to property used predominantly outside the United States. 93
188. Credit of foreign taxes against domestic tax liability, rather than their deduction
from income, would be necessary to achieve international equity under an accrual basis
regime.

189. See generally I.R.C. §§ 541-47 (provisions relating to personal holding companies);
id. §§ 531-37 (unreasonable accumulations of surplus): id. § 269 (acquisitions made to evade
or avoid income tax). The judicial doctrine of the "sham" company is discussed in Gregory
1. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1935) (L. Hand, J.); Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566 (1966).
190. I.R.C. § 902.
191. Id. §§ 1501, 1504.
192. Id. § 243.
193. Id. § 48(a) (2).
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The ForeignCompany as Taxpayer

Evaluating what is fair for the foreign company as taxpayer depends
on whether its tax burden is compared with that of a domestic or foreign
company. If the host state rate is lower than that of the shareholder state,
the income of a company owned by shareholders subject to an accrual
regime will bear a greater tax burden than that of a similar company owned
by residents of the host state. Compared with a company resident in the
capital-exporting state, however, the burden on the foreign company income
is similar to that of other domestic corporations, except to the extent that
domestic corporations benefit from special deductions and credits in computing tax liability.1 94 Because the additional tax burden imposed on the
American-controlled enterprise may reduce the amount of profit available
for reinvestment in company business, accrual basis regimes may threaten
the ability of American-owned companies to compete with foreign-owned
95
rivals.1
C.

The Hybrid Taxpayer: Shareholder and Company Integrated

The feeling that the shareholder in a foreign corporation is receiving
preferential treatment results from the foreign company's freedom from direct
taxation by the shareholder's country of residence or incorporation. The
profits of the active foreign corporation are not taxed until remitted as a
dividend. If the relevant taxpayer is seen as an integration of shareholder
and company, unfairness may result when the foreign tax rate is either higher
or lower than the domestic rate.
Treating the foreign company as a branch of the parent shareholder
would reduce this inequity. Foreign profits would be attributed to the
domestic taxpayer on a current basis, and domestic profits might be set off
against foreign losses. Such equity is inherent in the French mre-fille
regime 96 and was so in the German Organschaft concept prior to 19 7 2 ,1.9
where the corporate veil is pierced equitably for both taxpayer and tax
collector.
194. See notes 191-93 and accompanying text supra; note 200 and accompanying text infra.
195. See House Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 11, at 4497 (testimony of Harry Heltzer,
Chairman, Board of Directors, 3M Company); id. at 4617 (testimony of Donald M. Kendall,
Chairman, Emergency Committee for American Trade, and Chairman, Board of Directors,
Pepsico, Inc.); id at 4527 (statement of N.R. Danielian, President of International Economic
Policy Association); id., pt. 12, at 4774 (statement of Robert Dixson, Chairman of the
National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., and former Vice-Chairman of Johnson & Johnson
International).
196. C. GEN. IMp6TS art. 209 quinquies (1977) (Fr.).
197. Steueranpassungsgesetz [StAnpG], §§ 15, 16, [1934] Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1] I 925
(W. Ger.) (repealed in relevant part 1972). An Organgesellschajt, a dependent foreign company, was deemed to have the place of management of the dominant resident company, the Organtrilger,into which it was economically integrated. The corporate veil of the
Organgesellschajt was lifted for the benefit of the shareholder as well as of the revenue
authorities, since subsidiary losses could be set off against parent profits. The requirement
that parent and subsidiary be "economically integrated," however, made the Organschajt
inapplicable to holding companies, and thus useless as a tool for combatting use of foreign
tax havens. For a fuller discussion of the Organschajt, see Landwehrmann, supra note 9,
at 243-52.
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Extending the Subpart F provisions to all types of income, however,
would result in inequity for shareholders of foreign companies as compared
with shareholders of domestic ones. Although the foreign profits would
be included in the shareholder's income, the benefits of complete integration
would not be granted. A complete accrual regime would tax all undistributed
foreign income as earned, but the foreign losses would not be available to
offset shareiolder profits, since under American tax law consolidation of
the taxable income of an affiliated foreign corporation is not permitted. *08
Moreover, because Subpart F income is a "deemed dividend," the foreign income attributed to the shareholder would be taxed at the "nominal"
rather than the "effective" tax rates' 99 since the special deductions and
credits allowed by the taxing country as incentives to achieve particular
social and economic objectives are not part of normal accounting methods
for determining net income and, therefore, are not available to foreign
companies. 200 Taxpayers operating abroad through corporations would be
disadvantaged not only in comparison with those taxpayers having shareholdings in domestic companies, but also in comparison with taxpayers
operating overseas through a branch, even though the corporate form for the
foreign investment might be dictated by valid business considerations.201
D. Shareholder Control of Undistributed Profits

Few would argue that an income tax should be imposed before there
is income. However, an economic benefit may accrue even though money
or goods have not changed hands. A taxpayer may have the power to command income or consume goods and services not actually realized.202 Ac198. I.R.C. § 1501. Consolidation of income tax returns is permitted only for subsidiaries
incorporated in the United States, and only if at least 80% of their stock is owned by one
of the companies included in the consolidated return. If a consolidated return is not filed,
then 85% of the dividends received may be deducted from income. Id. § 243. Similar
"affiliation privileges" are granted to German companies owning not less than 25% of the
distributing corporation. AStG § 9. The Canadian exemption for dividends received from a
foreign corporation in which it owns at least 25% of the voting stock has been abolished with
respect to dividends received out of post-1975 profits. Substituted for the dividend exemption
is a credit against Canadian tax for direct (Le., withholding tax imposed on dividend) and
indirect (i.e., subsidiary corporate tax) foreign taxes. Canadian Income Tax Act, supra note
8, § 113.
199. Effective rates for the United States, Canada, and Germany, respectively, have been
estimated at 37.5%, 40.5%, and 35.3%. S. SuiumY, supra note 6, at 74; Musgrave, Tax
Preferences, supra note 6, at 191. Nominal rates, respectively, are 46%, 50%, and 60%.
Musgrave, supra note 69, at 43.
200. For a discussion of "tax incentives" see S. Stuiny, supra note 6; Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Hv. L. REv. 705 (1970).
201. On the importance of the corporate form to international joint ventures, see Liebman,
Tax Treatment of Joint Venture Income Under Subpart F: Some Issues and Alternatives, 32
Bus. LA w. 341 (1977); Note, Joint Venture Corporations:Drafting the Corporate Papers, 78
H1Av. L. REv. 393 (1964).
202. A shareholder "realizes" income when there has been a transfer of something of
value from company assets to the assets of the shareholder. See generally Commissioner v.
First Security Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 403 (1972); Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 168 (1942);
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (holding dividends in stock of the distributing
company not to be taxable income); Vestey v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, 11977] 3 All. E.R.
1073 (Ch.); Treas. Reg. § 1A51-2 (1977); Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1962 Before the
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crual basis regimes create a presumption of agency between the shareholder
and the company, whereby the shareholder is charged with "constructive
receipt" of an aliquot portion of the company income.
Considerable debate has focused on the threshold of control over the
company's affairs which justifies a presumption that a shareholder has the
command over or the benefit of corporate income. 20 3 Effective control
clearly may be exercised by a minority of shareholders. For example, ownership of the majority of shares may be widely diffused, or the minority may
have management contracts, licenses, or marketing agreements with the
company. Appropriate tests for determining control, however, are not
evident.
The existing accrual basis regimes deal with this problem in different
ways. The United States and Japanese regimes tax any shareholder who
owns at least ten percent of a foreign company's voting equity, provided
that more than fifty percent of the voting equity is controlled by their shareholders. 20 4 Under the German regime more than half of the equity must be
owned by West German residents, but there is no minimum holding requirement for each shareholder. 20 5 Thus a German with even a de minimis share
of a foreign company will be taxed on the unreceived foreign income as long
as German interests-whether or not in actual control of the companycontrol an aggregate of more than half the stock of the foreign entity. The
Canadian legislation provides that a minimum ten percent equity is necessary
to subject a Canadian shareholder to the FAPI regime as long as actual voting control of the company is exercised by a group of which the shareholder
is a member. 20 6 Under all four regimes, therefore, a minority shareholder
with interests different from those who actually control the company may
be taxed on undistributed profits beyond his or its command. The failure
of the minority shareholder to force distribution of a dividend might be due
to a divergence of interest from that of the other shareholders (who felt
reinvestment of profits made better sense), rather than to tax avoidance
2
motives. 07
Senate Comm. on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7, at 3039 (1962) (statement of Prof.
Adrian A. Kragen); B. BrrrKER, FEnERAL INCOME, EsTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 56-68 (3d ed.
1964); Williamson, Fruition of Potential Income-Contingent or Realized, 40 TAXEs 619

(1962).
203. See generally Liebman, supra note 201.
204. See I.R.C. §§ 951(b), 957(a); Sozei Tokubetu Sochi-hoo art. 66-6, Diet. Statute No.
14 of 1978, discussed in text accompanying note 59 supra.
205. See Landwehrmann, supra note 9, at 275.
206. Canadian Income Tax Act, supra note 8, §§ 91(1), 95(1)(d).
207. A showing that neither the creation of the controlled foreign corporation nor the
income-producing transaction has as one of its significant purposes a substantial reduction of
income taxes will exempt shareholders from the tax imposed by Subpart F. I.R.C. § 954(b) (4).
The tax avoidance motive may be "significant," and thus fatal to the shareholder's case, even

if not "principal" or "of first importance" Treas. Reg. § 1.954-1(b) (4) (iii) (1977). The
West German regime in effect allows rebuttal of the presumption that a refusal to distribute
dividends was motivated by a desire to avoid taxation by a showing that the foreign company
is subject to substantial (a 30% rate) income tax in the state of its statuory seat or place of
management. AStG § 8(3).
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Conceptual coherence and consistency are to some extent related to
fairness. A sense of inequity results when the taxing sovereign treats the
company as a separate taxpayer only when convenient. The prevalence of
the corporation tax indicates that states find the company useful as a taxpayer, 208 and it is unlikely that states which adopt accrual regimes will stop
taxing companies incorporated under their laws or resident within their
borders. If a foreign investor were to interpose a wholly-owned Delaware
company between himself and operating subsidiaries outside the United
States, the worldwide income of the Delaware corporation would be taxable
by the United States. Even if it lacked commercial substance, the corporation would be considered an American taxpayer.20 9 Standards of "genuineness" are applied in a discriminatory fashion against foreign entities.
E.

Summary

Conclusions about the equity of accrual basis taxation depend very
much on the definition of the relevant taxpayer, assumptions about the
threshold of ownership permitting shareholder control of corporate wealth,
and the provisions of the tax regime in question. Extension of Subpart F
to industrial profits would result in unfairness on several levels to shareholders of foreign corporations. Foreign losses would not be allowed to
offset domestic profits, and credits and deductions available to a domestic
subsidiary would not always be available to the foreign subsidiary.2 10 On
the other hand, where the foreign tax rate is lower than the domestic, the
shareholder of the foreign entity would be free to reinvest the tax differential.
Treating the foreign company as a branch of the parent shareholder
would go far toward eliminating these inequities. The domestic and the
foreign subsidiary would be on an equal footing except for deductions and
credits specifically limited to domestic investment. Foreign profits would
be attributed to the domestic taxpayer on a current basis, and domestic
profits might be set off against foreign losses.
IV.

RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS THROUGH ALLOCATION

OF EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE

International law provides few rules for choosing among rival claims
to legislative jurisdiction. When a state has a recognized basis for prescribing rules to govern a person or activity, international law is usually neutral.
208. The Royal Commission on Taxation concluded that it was "extremely useful to
treat corporations as persons 'in contemplation of law,'" and that corporate taxation was "an
inexpensive method of collecting taxes." 4 CARTER REPORT, supra note 73, at 3.
209. The dividends from the holding company to the foreign investor, however, would
not be subject to withholding tax at source, by virtue of I.R.C. § 861(a)(2), which exempts
from the definition of United States source income dividends received by a corporation less
than 20% of whose gross income is from sources within the United States.
210. See text accompanying notes 191-93, 200 supra.
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211
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
sets forth this position in sections 37 and 39:
Section 37. Exercise of Jurisdiction Not Necessarily Exclusive
A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law
may exercise such jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that another
state also has jurisdiction ....

Section 39. Inconsistent Requirements Do Not Affect Jurisdiction
(1) A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule
of law is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another state having jurisdiction with respect to that conduct.
Comment (b) to section 39 specifically deals with the type of conflict
between repatriation and reinvestment of earnings -which might arise from
accrual basis taxation of active business income:
(1) State A requires all its nationals abroad to remit a portion of
their earnings. X, a national of A, is residing and working in state
B, which forbids X to make remittances to A. Both states have
bases of jurisdiction, which international law recognizes, to prescribe rules for X's conduct with respect to remittances. Neither
state is required by international law to forego the exercise of its
prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction solely because of the fact
that the other state has jurisdiction and has exercised it in a contrary manner.
A fortiori, the validity of jurisdiction would not be affected by claims which,
although relating to the same income, address commands to different persons,
i.e., shareholder and company.
Most states are nevertheless likely to find such unresolved conflict undesirable in the long term. Maximization of wealth-producing activity
requires a reduction in the public strains and private injustices which result
from transnational jurisdictional overlap. A uniform rule for the allocation
of taxing competence would further the interest of all states in full utilization
of the planet's resources. Richer states may accept equality of participation
in economic benefits in order to enlist the help of poorer peoples in the
wealth-creating processes. To groups not presently sharing pro rata in the
world's goods and services the benefits need no explanation. The common
interest in the production of goods and services may require the sacrifice of
a state's exclusive interests in collecting revenue or protecting jobs, and
sovereign states may have to limit the exercise of otherwise legitimate prerogatives which run counter to the furtherance of common values or goals.
Two more specific objectives of the world community relate to the
efficient production and fair distribution of wealth: (i) the reduction of re211.

REsTATEmENT

2D, supra note 3, §§ 37, 39.
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straints on transnational capital movement 212 and (ii) a nation's control of
the economic activity of its own residents within its own borders. 213 Similar
objectives of American federalism impose constitutional restraints on state
taxation of interstate commerce: multiple burdens on interstate commerce
are to be avoided, and one state may not invade fields reserved to sister
states. 214 Unlike a federal system, however, international law has thus far
developed few legal norms limiting inconsistent national legislation, or reconciling the obvious conflict between the objectives themselves.
Measures for the liberalization of capital movements adopted by both
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) afford wide escape hatches.
"Economic and financial disturbance" are grounds for derogation of the
OECD guidelines.2 i 5 The IMF Articles of Agreement prohibit restrictions
on payments for current, but not capital, transactions.2 16 Even exchange
restrictions on current transactions are allowed to a state which does not
deem itself past the post-World War II "transitional period." 217
Similarly, norms against interference with the internal economic activity
of another state have few practical applications. The U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States grants each state the right to "regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its
national objectives and priorities." 218 However, the right of one nation to
regulate reinvestment of earnings by its corporate creatures may run afoul
of the right of another state to regulate foreign investment by its own corporations. To prohibit interference in economic activity within one state may
limit regulation by another state of its companies' extraterritorial activity.
Even the objectives of freer transnational capital movement may yield
inconsistent policies. If a foreign subsidiary would have been established
but for the parent state's accrual basis tax regime, the regime constitutes
an inhibition to transnational capital movement. If the foreign investment
would be made only because of local tax incentives, however, an accrual
212. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-487 (1976); Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 67-73, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958);
ORGANIZATION

FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

CODE OF LIBBRALISATION

OF CAPrrAL MoVEmENT, art. l(a) (1962) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF LIBERALISATION], See
also Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401,
T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, art. VI, § 3, art. VIII, § 2(a), art. XIV, art. XIX [hereinafter cited as IMF Articles of Agreement].
213. See U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962);
U.N. General Assembly Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6th Spec. Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); Programme of Action on Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3202, 6th Spec. Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974);
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 251 (1975).
214. See notes 242-45 and accompanying text infra.
215. CODE OF LiERALisATIO N, supra note 212, art. 7(b).
216. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 212, art. VI, § 3.
217. Id. art. XIV.
218. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 213, art. 2(2).
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basis regime merely counterbalances state-created distortion of capital
219

movement.
Two approaches to conflict resolution will be considered below. The
first is the unilateral exercise of self-restraint by the capital-exporting state
in taxing economic activity within the territory of the host state.

Second,

consideration will be given to the development of a doctrine of international
law limiting the exercise of a state's fiscal competence, based on the "general
principles of law" recognized by article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. 220

Neither of these approaches is likely to be satisfactory,

however, and this Article proposes a better solution-the allocation of exclusive competence to the host state by means of treaties.
Self-Restraint
The broad scope of American assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction
in non-tax matters makes it unlikely, in the near future at least, that the
A.

interests of other states will be acknowledged by the United States as impos-

ing limits on its taxing power. Claims of the United States to extraterritorial
jurisdiction have been extensive in the area of antitrust, 221 corporate securities regulation, 222 foreign bribes, 223 profit repatriation by foreign companies,2

24

and the embargo of trade with communist countries.

American concession to criticism voiced by governments

220

220

The only

and scholars 227

219. See the discussion of neutrality in text accompanying notes 102-106 supra. See also
Impact of Multinationals, supra note 68, at 91-94; Technical Papers: Taxation, supra note 69;
COLUMBIA CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6.

220. For a discussion of art. 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, see J. BRImRLY, supra note 133, at 62-63; F. MANN, Reflections on'a Commercial Law
of Nations, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 140, 158-66 (1973).
221. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); K.
BREwsmR, supra note 135.
222. Registration requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are applicable to
foreign issuers unless exempted by order or by regulations of the Securities and Exchange
The registration requirements of the
Commission. See 15 U.S.C. §781(g)(3) (1976).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are specifically extended to foreign issues if the class of
securities issued has more than 300 holders resident in the United States. See 17 C.F.R.
§240.12g3-2 (1978). See generally Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 94 (1969).
223. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-1 (West Supp.
1978), (making unlawful certain corrupt payments to foreign government officials and foreign
political parties); I.R.C. § 952(a) (4) (adding the amount of foreign bribes to Subpart F income); id. § 995(b) (1) (F) (iii) (classifying the amount of the 'foreign bribe as a deemed distribution, thus denying benefits of provisions relating to Domestic International Sales Corporations).
See generally SEcUrIEs AND EXCHANGE COMMSSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (submitted to Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong, 2d Sess.) (Comm. Print 1976).
224. See text accompanying notes 152-55 supra.
225. See note 66 supra.
226. See, e.g., 1 E. LAUTERPAcT, THE CoNTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNrmt KiNGDOM
IN TE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 15-18 (1962). A British cabinet minister described the
American exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction as "acting as if the United States had the
right to regulate the affairs of the world as a whole." 698 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1217
(1964); see Mann, Anglo-American Conflict of International Jurisdiction, 13 Irr'L & COMP.
L.Q. 1460 (1964).
227. See, e.g., Jennings, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws,
33 BRrr. Y. B. INT'L L 146, 161-75 (1958); Extra-TerritorialApplication of Restrictive Trade
Legislation, in

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AssocIATIoN, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRsT CONFER-

ENCE 304-592 (1964).
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appears to be a recognition that when a person is subject to conflicting
directives of different sovereigns, considerations of fairness and comity may
argue for moderation of the enforcement, but not prescription, of rules. 228
When interaction between states is symmetrical or nearly so, accommodation of the vital interests of other states through self-restraint may be
expected. The nexus which justifies jurisdiction by state X over a transaction within state Y will also be warrant for the application of the law of
state Y to events in state X. 22 9 Self-restraint is thus encouraged by a fear
of retaliation.
When interaction is not symmetrical, however, as in the case of direct
investment between a highly industrialized state and a developing country, less
mutual forbearance is to be expected. "Just and prudent" decisions risk
becoming a policy of "he takes who can." Not surprisingly, the debate
among American economists and lawyers over a just regime for taxing
foreign corporate income centers on the impact of accrual basis taxation on
the United States, rather than on the host countries. 2 0 The expectation
that capital exporters will spontaneously restrain themselves in the extraterritorial exercise of their taxing power is therefore likely to be disappointed.
B.

23
A General Doctrine of Public International Law 1

National legal systems often impose limits on actions that are prima
facie legitimate. Such restrictions may provide principles appropriate for
application in international law. The cases discussed below present patterns
that will be explored as analogies for a doctrine of international law that
would further resolution of conflicts engendered by accrual basis taxation.
In a federal system, state legislation that is otherwise lawful may become illegal when it results in violation of national norms. The 1926 case
228. See Lowenfeld, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. Rnv. 1699, 1705 (1965). RESTATnMENT
2D, supra note 3, § 40 sets forth the doctrine as follows:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other

state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected
to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
229. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953) (refusing to apply an American
statute to a Danish flag ship).
230. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 6; FOREIGN INCOME TASK FORCE REPORT
supra note 6; P. MusoGRAvE, supra note 6; TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME, supra note
6, at 11; Tillinghast, supra note 17.
231. The domestic law of a federation of jurisdictions with limited sovereignty has been
used as a source of public international law when not inconsistent with other principles of
international law. See Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 1905, 1950 (1941).
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of Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya23 2 provides an example. To increase
the business of its insurance agents, New Mexico prohibited payment of
brokerage fees to non-residents for policies covering risks in New Mexico.
The Court held this exclusion of a foreign insurance company unconstitutional. Justice Holmes rejected the argument that the exclusion was constitutional because it was legitimate on its face:
[I]t has been held a great many times that the most absolute seeming rights are qualified, and in some circumstances become wrong.
One of the most frequently recurring instances is when the socalled right is used as part of a scheme to accomplish a forbidden
result .... [T]he right to exclude a foreign corporation cannot be
used.., to tax it upon property that by established principles the
State has no power to tax . . . or to interfere with interstate
commerce ....

233

The limits imposed on the fiscal jurisdiction of states by the United
States Constitution and the doctrine of abuse of rights in continental law
provide similar limitations on prima facie legitimate activity. These limits,
which may exemplify a more general legal phenomenon, are explored below
as possible analogies for a doctrine of public international law.
1. State Taxation of Interstate Commerce. The tenth amendment of
the United States Constitution reserves to the states "those powers not delegated to the United States." This concept of state sovereignty includes the
right to tax. However, the right to tax may be limited by two other constitutional provisions: (1) the commerce clause, delegating to Congress the
right to regulate commerce "with foreign Nations, and among the several
States"; 34 and (2) the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
which establishes a standard of elementary fairness for state behavior.
The requirements of the commerce and due process clauses have been
interpreted to prevent taxation of subjects over which state control and protection do not extend.235 Unfortunately, judicial attempts to define these
limits lack clarity and consistency. Justice Frankfurter admitted thirty years
ago:
"[The history of the] power of the States to tax and the limitations
upon that power . ..is spread over hundreds of volumes of our Reports.

To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past would neither
clarify what has gone before nor guide the future." 236
232. 270 U.S. 426 (1926).
233. Id. at 434-35.
234. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 127-228

(9th ed. 1975).
235. See Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949) (striking down Wisconsin inheritance tax on out-of-state tangible property of Wisconsin testator). See also Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
236. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1946).

1652

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1609

27
The rules have not become less complex in the years that have passed.
thus boding ill for a general doctrine of public international law. Nonetheless, some "firm peaks of decision" 238 can be discovered in this area.
a. Multiple Burdens. The taxation of interstate commerce is prohibited when it subjects such commerce to "cumulative burdens not imposed
on local commerce." 289 The "multiple burdens" restriction has not, however, prevented states from imposing corporate income taxes apportioning
the total income of the corporation according to a formula giving weight to
geographical distribution of property, payroll, and sales.240 Moreover, three
states-Alaska, California, and Oregon-have adopted a "unitary" system
for apportioning income, which calculates taxable income according to a
affiliates, even
formula which takes into account the profits of all corporate
241
if they conduct no business at all in the taxing state.
The disregard of corporate personality under the unitary system does,
however, differ in an important way from an accrual basis regime in that
the state tax will be roughly territorial in application. Factors used in apportionment formulas-property, payroll, and sales-usually result in the
taxation of 'income with a modicum of relationship to the affiliated companies' intrastate business activity. Accrual basis regimes have no similar
result.
Eliminating "multiple burdens" may be of some value in reducing strains
among capital exporters, where there may exist overlapping taxation of the
same person or the same income. However, this approach is bound to fail
to satisfy the jurisdictional claims of capital importing states, concerned not
with multiple burdens, but with any burdens at all that may vitiate their tax
incentive legislation.
237. See generally G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLINO, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAxATioN (2d ed. 1950); G. GuNTmER, supra note 234, at 277-372; McLure, State Income Taxation of Multistate Corporations in the United States of America, in Technical Papers:
Taxation, supra note 69, at 58-111; Note, State Taxation of Interstate Businesses and the
Multistate Tax Compact: The Search for a Delicate Uniformity, 11 CoLum. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 231 (1975); Note, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75
HARv.L RaV. 953 (1962).
238. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)
(Clark, J.).
239. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256 (1938).
240. See General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 559 (1965). The
term "allocation" is normally used in respect of income which has its source in intrastate
commerce, while interstate income is "apportioned."
241. See generally FOBIGN INCOME TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 25-30; McLure,
supra note 237, at 80. Article 9(4) of the 1975 U.S.-U.K. Convention on Double Taxation
would have relieved British companies from application of the unitary system. 2 TAx
TREATIEs (CCH) i 81031. On June 27, 1978, the Senate approved the treaty subject to a
reservation respecting article 9(4); the treaty has been resubmitted to Parliament. The unitary
system and article 9(4) have generated acrimony on both sides of the Atlantic. See Comment, Article 9(4) of the Proposed United States-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty, 1"
The FOREIGN INCOME TA sK FORCE REPORT recomCOLUM.L J. TRANsNAT'L L. 280 (1978).
mended that states be precluded from taking into account, under the unitary method, the
income of foreign corporations until such time as the income is subject to federal tax. The
task force did not consider any of the arguments against state taxation of foreign source income to be relevant to the issue of whether the federal income tax should be imposed on
foreign income on a current basis.
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b. Unconstitutional Conditions. The second line of cases relates to
franchise taxes imposed on out-of-state corporations for the privilege of
conducting intrastate business. 242 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions forbids the imposition of an otherwise valid tax when it represents
an indirect -attempt to control matters properly subject to the authority of a
sister state. The purpose for which a tax is imposed must therefore be
considered in determining its legitimacy.
Under this doctrine, the Court has struck down state statutes imposing
franchise taxes in return for the grant of the privilege of engaging in business
within the state, even though the Court admitted that the privilege might
243
have been denied altogether. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas,
decided in 1910, involved a state statute requiring foreign corporations to
pay a fee, based on the value of the corporation's capital stock, in order to
do intrastate business. The levy was held to be an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce. The Court also said the tax was an attempt to
- 44
"invade forbidden fields" by taxing property located outside the state.
The effect of the rule in the Western Union case was restricted, however, in the case of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia.245 A franchise fee
calculated on the value of a company's authorized capital stock was imposed
as a condition to entry of an out-of-state corporation for the purpose of
engaging in a purely local activity, even though it concurrently was in the
state for the purpose of doing interstate business. The local business in
Atlantic Refining was deemed economically separable from the interstate
246
business, and thus no apportionment was required.
Applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by analogy to
national income taxation presents an interesting approach to possible limitation of national fiscal jurisdiction. Because a nation may forbid the export
of its capital, it might be suggested that the privilege of investing abroad
could be made subject to taxation of the profits derived therefrom. When,
however, such taxation interferes with matters properly subject to the control of another nation, such as the reinvestment of local earnings by its
corporations, the power to tax might be limited.
The doctrine is probably unsuited for application to the international
community, however. The legitimacy of a tax depends upon the legitimacy
of its underlying object; that is, whether it is intended to accomplish a
242. See generally Hale, UnconstitutionalConditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM.
L. REv. 321 (1935); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
243. 216 U.S. 1 (1910).
244. Id. at 38. See also Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1917) (rejecting
state's argument that similar taxes were valid because they involved exercise of "an intrinsically
local power").
245. 302 U.S. 22 (1937).
246. Cf. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (upholding
application of a tax on the privilege of doing business within a state to a business engaged
in interstate commerce "when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce and
is fairly related to the services provided by the State"). See also Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co.
v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290 (1922).
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legitimate purpose. Because the norms and practice of the international
community are less clearly defined than those of a federal system, it would
be unrealistic to expect success in a search for the legitimate purposes of a
nation's income tax. Even in the United States the doctrine has never been
applied to income taxes. When consistent doctrines cannot be formulated
among geographically propinquitous and economically integrated units of a
federal system, efforts to do so for politically, economically, and culturally
diverse sovereigns are likely to be disappointing.
2. Abuse of Rights. Income tax treaties usually provide that the
industrial and commercial profiits of an enterprise of one contracting state
are not taxable in the other. A "savings clause" in the majority of such
treaties entered into by the United States gives the United States the right to

determine the tax base of its citizens, residents, and corporations "as though
[the] Convention has not come into effect." 247 An attempt to end deferral
for commercial and industrial profits of companies incorporated in countries
with which the United States has concluded income tax treaties would raise
the question whether the right provided by the savings clause is abused when
it is extended to tax active foreign business income never actually received
by the American resident.
247. Industrial and commercial profits of an enterprise of one contracting state arc
generally taxable only in that state unless the enterprise carries on business in the other
state through a "permanent establishment" situated therein. See, e.g., Convention on Double
Taxation: Income, May 14, 1953, United States-Australia, art. III, 4 U.S.T. 2274, T.I.A.S.
No. 2880; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Oct. 25, 1956, United States-Austria, art.
III, 8 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. No. 3923; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, July 9,
1970, United States-Belgium, art. 7, 23 U.S.T. 2687, T.I.A.S. No. 7463; Convention on Double
Taxation: Income, Oct. 25, 1966, United States-Canada, art. I, 18 U.S.T. 3186, T.I.A.S. No.
6415; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, May 6, 1948, United States-Denmark, art.
III, 62 Stat. 1730, T.I.A.S. No. 1854; Convention on Double Taxation: Income and
Property, Mar. 6, 1970, United States-Finland, art. 8, 22 U.S.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 7042; Convention on Double Taxation: Income and Property, July 28, 1967, United States-France, art.
6, 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, July 22,
1954, United States-West Germany, art. III, 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133; Convention
on Double Taxation: Income, Feb. 20, 1950, United States-Greece, art. III, 5 U.S.T. 47,
T.I.A.S. No. 2902; Convention on Double Taxation: Income and Capital, May 7, 1975,
United States-Iceland, art. 8, 26 U.S.T. 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 8151; Convention on Double
Taxation: Income, Sept. 13, 1949, United States-Ireland, art. III, 2 U.S.T. 2303, T.I.A.S. No.
2356; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Mar. 30, 1955, United States-Italy, art. III,
7 U.S.T. 2999, T.I.A.S. No. 3679; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Mar. 8, 1971,
United States-Japan, art. 8, 23 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7365; Convention on Double Taxation:
Income and Property, Dec. 18, 1962, United States-Luxembourg, art. III, 15 U.S.T. 2355,
T.I.A.S. No. 5726; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Mar. 16, 1948, United StatesNew Zealand, art. III, 2 U.S.T. 2378, T.I.A.S. No. 2360; Convention on Double Taxation:
Income and Property, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Norway, art. 5, 23 U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S.
No. 7474; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, July 1, 1957, United States-Pakistan,
art. III, 10 U.S.T. 984, T.I.A.S. No. 4232; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Oct.
8, 1974, United States-Poland, art. 8, 28 U.S.T. 891, T.I.A.S. No. 8486; Convention on
Double Taxation: Income, Dec. 4, 1973, United States-Romania, art. 7, 27 U.S.T. 165, T.I.A.S.
No. 8228; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Dec. 13, 1946, United States-South
Africa, art. V, 3 U.S.T. 3821, T.I.A.S. No. 2510; Convention on Double Taxation: Income
and Other Taxes, Mar. 23, 1939, United States-Sweden, art. II, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958;
Convention on Double Taxation: Income, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, art. III,
2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316; Convention on Double Taxation: Income, Jan. 9, 1970,
United States-Trinidad and Tobago, art. 8, 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 7047; Convention on
Double Taxation: Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1975, United States-United Kindom,
arts. 3, 7, 2 TAx TptEATIms (CCH) h%8103C, 8103G (this treaty is not yet in force, see note
241 supra).
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Prohibition of abuse of rights is generally foreign to Anglo-American
tort law.248 The continental jurist will be more familiar with the doctrine of
abus de droit. Article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code provides: "Every person is
bound to exercise his rights and fulfill his obligations according to principles
of good faith." Article 226 of the German Civil Code forbids "the exercise
of a right ... when its only object is to cause damage to another." French
case law prohibits the exercise of a right so as to harm others when there is
249
no benefit for the one exercising the right.

Rights are abused when there is no reasonable relation between the
right and its legitimate end. 250 Whether a right can be abused when its exer-

cise does bring benefits to the one who exercises it was the issue addressed by
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of the Free Zones of
Upper Savoy & the District of Gex.2 1 After the Napoleonic wars a free
trade zone was established between Geneva and the two districts on the

French side of what is now the Franco-Swiss border. In 1923 France decided to reestablish its customs frontier at the Franco-Swiss border, thereby
abolishing the free trade zone. The Permanent Court of International Justice

was asked to decide whether France was in breach of its obligations under
the 1815 Declaration of the Powers at Vienna. The Court admitted that by
virtue of its sovereignty France could establish a police cordon at the political frontier. But the Court added:
"A reservation must be made as regards the case of abuses of a right,
since it is certain that France must not evade the obligation to maintain the
zones by erecting a customs barrier under the guise of a control cordon." 25r2
The field of air pollution may also provide precedents for the tax area,
principally because the cases speak more of injury than of good faith. In
248. Over eighty years ago, in Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, [1895] A.C. 587, a landowner
was allowed to sink a well solely to drain his neighbor's spring. Even if it is "shocking to a
moral philosopher," declared Lord Macnaghten, "churlish, selfish and grasping" behavior
would not be stopped by the law of England. Id. at 601.
249. See Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22, 31-41 (1935). Related to
abuse of rights is the French concept of fraude i la lol. Article 909 of the Code Civil,
prohibiting a physician from inheriting from a person treated by the physician during a final
illness, presents a useful illustration of the doctrine. For obvious reasons, French case law
excepted spouses from the application of article 909. For equally evident reasons, however,
attempts to evade the article by marrying dying patients have been condemned as a "fraud
on the law." See B. AuDrr, LA FRAUDE A LA Loi 3-4 (1974).
To speak of abuse of rights is to some extent logically and linguistically inconsistent. If
a court prohibits conduct, then it was not in fact a "right" at all.
250. See generally B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 121-36 (1953); H. LAuTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CoMMUNITY 286-306 (1933); Gutteridge, supra note 249.
251. (France v. Switzerland) [1930] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 24; [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No.
46. In its first decision the court held that the Free Zones had not been abolished by article
435 of the Treaty of Versailles. The second decision described in more detail the respective
obligations of France and Switzerland with regard to the Free Zones. For a general discussion
of the Free Zones, see Th6venaz, Les Zones Franches de la Haute-Savoie et du Pays de Gex,
14 ScmEIZamuscHs JAHPBUCH FUR INTErNATIONALES REcHr 69 (1957).
252. [1930] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 24, at 12. The relevance of the object for which a
state exercises a per se legitimate power was also emphasized by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819): "Should Congress . . . under
the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted
to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an
act was not the law of the land."
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the Trail Smelter Arbitration,25 3 a Canadian smelter emitted noxious sulphur
dioxide fumes which were carried down the Columbia River into Washington.
The smelter was required to make capital expenditures to reduce pollution
damage to Washington. While Canada undoubtedly had jurisdiction over
the smelter, its competence could not be exercised without regard for the

interests of other states. The scope of legitimate jurisdiction was restricted
25 4
because of its effects on another state.
The Lake Lanoux Arbitration25 5 set limits to the Trail Smelter approach by refusing to condemn a French plan to generate electricity by
raising the level of a lake entirely within French territory, resulting in diversion of a river which served Spanish agriculture. The tribunal said that
France should show that "it is genuinely concerned to reconcile the interests
of the other riparian State with its own." 256 But the tribunal found no rule
of international law that "forbids one State, acting to safeguard its legitimate
interests, to put itself in a situation that would permit it in effect.., seriously
to injure a neighbouring State." 257
Characterization of the substance of events is at the heart of the
problem of determining when there has been an abuse of rights. To apply
the doctrine to transnational fiscal matters would require a showing that the
taxation of residents, in itself lawful, was merely the prohibited taxation of
foreign business profits under a different description. Because of the subjectivity involved, the doctrine would be difficult to apply to extraterritorial
253. (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
254. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, has been suggested as authority for
the broader proposition that a state may not exercise its sovereignty in such a way as to
create adverse effects in the territory of another state: sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
See Note, Method of Analysis and Precedents in the InternationalLitigation of Marine Pollution Claims, 9 COLUm. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 537, 560-61 (1973). A collision on the high seas
between the S. S. Lotus, a French mail steamer, and a Turkish collier, the Boz-Kourt, resulted
in the death of eight Turkish nationals. The Permanent Court of International Justice found
that exercise of criminal jurisdiction by Turkey over the captain of the Lotus, a French national, was permitted by international law. Read broadly, the case might by analogy support
the proposition that a capital exporter may not exercise its fiscal jurisdiction so as to create a
deleterious effect-loss of investment-in the capital importer. The rationale of the case
cuts both ways, however. The capital exporter may argue that by exercising jurisdiction over
its shareholder, or even over a foreign corporation, it is merely attempting to check adverse
consequences on its own territory, e.g., the outflow of capital or the loss of revenue.
255. (France v. Spain), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1957) (English translation in 24
I.L.R. 101).
256. 24 I.L.R. at 139.
257. Id. at 126.
Similar issues were raised by Australia's application to the International Court of Justice
regarding the legality of French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. Australia argued that
deposits of radioactive fallout on the Australian territory would impair its "independent right
to determine what acts shall take place within its territory." Hand], Territorial Sovereignty
and the Problem of Transnational Pollution, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 50, 50 (1975). We do not
know what the court thought of this argument, because no decision was rendered in light of
the announcement by France that its 1974 atmospheric tests would be the last. Nuclear Tests
Case (Australia v. France), [1974] I.C.J. 253, paras. 41, 51, reprinted in 69 AM. J. INT'I L
668, 677, 679 (1975). But scholarly consideration of the relevant case law and state practice
leads to the conclusion that a transfrontier crossing of pollutants does not in itself create
liability for the polluting state in the absence of material damage. See Handl, supra, at 75-76.
Applied to fiscal jurisdiction, this rule should require the host state to present proof of
pecuniary loss resulting from the accrual basis regime of the capital-exporting state.
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fiscal jurisdiction, except in cases of clearly malicious interference in the
affairs of the host state. For example, the United Kingdom could not rightfully disrupt French road safety by granting special tax credits to those of its
258
subjects who, when in France, continued to drive on the left side of the road.
In the normal exercise of fiscal legislative jurisdiction, however, the only
presently accepted jurisdictional limit is the requirement of at least one
"relevant nexus" between the state and the person or property taxed. 259 The

minimization of conflct in an increasingly economically integrated world,
however, requires more than a prohibition against clearly malicious interference with the affairs of other nations.
C.

Allocation of Jurisdictionby Treaty

States should consider moderating their exercise of fiscal jurisdiction
over the foreign activity of corporate creatures of another state to take into
account both the vital economic interests of the state of corporate residence
and the actual control, by residents or citizens of the taxing state, over the
company's income. This approach is not a radical departure from principles
of jurisdiction applied in non-fiscal matters. States do not, in fact, behave as
though their right to prescribe rules was unfettered, even as to persons within
their borders. Sovereign 2 60 and diplomatic 261 immunities, fair treatment of
aliens,2 2 and respect for human rights 263 illustrate areas where a state's
otherwise legitimate exercise of territorial jurisdiction has been limited in
view of common interests of the international community.2 64
258. See, e.g., F. MANNer, supra note 2, at 77 ("[T]he local law will have to be allowed
to prevail, for every other solution would be destructive of justice and international intercourse."); Jennings, supra note 227, at 151 ("[E]xtraterritorial jurisdiction may not be
exercised in such a way as to contradict the local law at the place where the alleged offence
was committed.").
259. See note 3 supra.
260. For a recent case reviewing the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Trendtex Trading
Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529. See generally I. BRowNLm, supra
note 176, at 314-32.
261. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature, Apr. 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force Apr. 24, 1964);
J.BrIERLY, supra note 133, at 254-64.
262. See J.BRiERLY, supra note 133, at 276-91; I. BROWNLm, supra note 176, at 505-34.
Although a state may exclude aliens from coming within its borders, it is bound to observe
certain standards of treatment toward them once admitted. McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen.
The Protection of Aliens from Discrimination and World Public Order: Responsibility of
States Conjoined with Human Rights, 70 AM. J. INr'L L. 432 (1976).
263. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56, 62, 68, 76; European Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force, Sept. 3, 1953); G.A. Res. 2106,
47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) (proposing the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, reprinted in BAsic DocumENTs iN INTERNATioNAL LAw 190-205 (2d ed. I. Brownlie ed.
1972)); United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71 (1948); I. BRowNLmE, supra note 176, at 535-81.
264. Brierly summarizes the general proposition: "[jEvery state has exclusive jurisdiction
within its own territory, but this jurisdiction is not absolute, because it is subject to certain
limitations imposed by international law." J. BmrunY,supra note 133, at 222.
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To a limited extent, the provisions of bilateral income tax conventions
balance competing interests. In respect of the earned income of an individual
with a permanent home in both states, exclusive competence is often allocated to the state of "closest economic connection" and "center of vital
interests." 265 A similar allocation of exclusive competence should also be
considered for corporate entities.
Eminent scholars have supported deferral to the interests of other states
when the assertion of jurisdiction affects activity outside national boundaries.
Jennings writes:
[T]he extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction must not be permitted
to extend to the point ... where in fact it becomes an interference
by one State in the affairs of another. . . A State has a right to

extraterritorial jurisdiction where its legitimate interests are concerned, but the right may be abused, and it is abused when it
becomes essentially an26 interference with the exercise of the local
territorial jurisdiction.
F.A. Mann advances a similar view. While admitting that the doctrine of
international jurisdiction is "not at present concerned with exclusivity of
jurisdiction," 267 he does not find the lex lata commendable. He states that
"from the point of view of the progressive evolution of international law
in
it would no doubt be desirable if . . . by common consent jurisdiction
08
respect of a given set of acts were exercised by one State only." 2

1. Treaties Among Capital-Exporting States. The bilateral income
tax treaty is one vehicle for reducing the inhibitive effects of accrual basis
taxation on joint ventures among capital-exporting states. Foreign tax credit
systems might be made applicable to multiple-tier corporate structures.
Where two capital-exporting states tax the earnings of a corporation organized or resident in a third country, the country of the ultimate (highest-tier)
shareholder(s) could give credit for tax imposed on the intervening entities
without requiring the actual distribution of taxed earnings. 26 9 Fiscal com265. See the discussion of Merg6 Claim in text accompanying notes 173-74 supra.
266. Jennings, supra note 227, at 153.
267. F. MANN, supra note 2, at 37.
268. Id. at 41.
See also B. AuDrr, supra note 249, at 41, suggesting an allocation of competence according to a principle of "effectivit6" :
S'il existe un droit international, celui-ci doit faire respecter une r6partition des
comptences entre les Etats, conforme A l'effectivit6 des situations. On peut meme
affirmer que le degr6 d'ach~vement du droit international se mesure notamment a sa
capacit6 d'assurer le respect d'une r6partition des comp6tences.
[If international law exists, it must enforce an allocation of jurisdiction among states,
conforming to genuine connections. One may even say that the maturity of international law is measured notably by its capacity to enforce an allocation of jurisdiction.]
269. Credit provisions such as these might still be ineffective, however, if the basis for
imposing the corporate income tax differed as between the two contracting parties. This
might occur if one state taxed companies incorporated therein, while another taxed companies
whose management and control was located within its borders. There would appear to be
little chance of treaty relief for an enterprise unwise enough to be caught in both nets. See
Convention on Double Taxation: Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1975, United States8103 A, as amended by Protocol,
United Kingdom, art. 1(2), 2 TAx TRETiES (CCH1)
Aug. 26, 1976, United States-United Kingdom, 2 TAx TRATms (CCH) 118103 DA (allowing
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petence of the country with the more direct link to the source of income
would be exclusive, at least up to the amount of tax it decides to impose.
Considerations of fairness to the state of the ultimate parent require
two limitations on such a credit. First, the intervening state tax available as
a credit should be the portion of tax imposed with regard to income actually
attributed to the shareholder. The intervening state might tax fifty percent
of the lowest-tier undistributed profits, while the country of the ultimate
shareholder, with a different definition of "tainted income," might decide to
include only twenty-five percent of these profits in the income of its taxpayer. Economic double taxation has occurred only as to a quarter of the
lowest-tier profits. If the intervening state imposes a ten-unit tax on the
fifty percent of lower-tier income included in its taxpayer's income, only
five of those units should be available as a credit in the state of the ultimate
parent. To do otherwise would allow the ultimate parent a credit for tax
on income never attributed to it.
Nor would the state of the ultimate parent wish to grant a credit for a
tax more onerous than its own. The intervening state might impose a greater
tax burden on the same portion of profits because of higher rates, or because

the intervening state includes in its definition of taxable income the foreign
tax paid with respect to the deemed distribution (the so-called "gross-up" of
the dividend).270

To take these considerations into account, a three clause treaty provision might be drafted. The first provision would provide:
(1) A taxpayer of one of the Contracting Parties,271 whose gross
income, by operation of the law of the Contracting Party, includes
a "dual resident" corporation the protection of the treaty only with respect to the U.K.
petroleum revenue tax) (this treaty is not yet in force, see note 241 supra).
270. United States corporations electing to have the benefits of the foreign tax credit
under I.R.C. § 960 must include in their income the amount ,of the foreign tax deemed paid.
I.R.C. § 78. Until January 1, 1977, however, "gross-up" was not required in respect of
I.R.C.
distributions from accumulated profits of a "less developed country corporation."
§ 960(a). If the dividend distribution is not "grossed up" there is in effect a double
allowance for the foreign tax paid, because it is taken both as a deduction (from the full
pre-tax dividend) and as a credit (against U.S. tax liability). In this case only a portion of
the foreign tax, "attributable" to the amount included, is then allowed in computing the
available credit. The tax available in computing the credit would be determined by applying
to the total foreign tax a fraction, with a numerator equal to the net profits (after foreign
taxes) and a denominator equal to the total foreign profits (before taxes). I.R.C. § 960(a) (1)
(D) (1970) (before amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat.
1525). In the event of "gross-up," the entire foreign tax would be available in computing the
credit. The credit available would be determined by applying to the foreign tax (or portion
thereof) another fraction, the numerator of which is the amount of profits included in the
shareholder's income and the denominator of which is the total subsidiary profits. For a
general discussion of problems in computing the foreign tax credit, see American Chicle Co.
v. United States, 316 U.S. 450 (1942); E. OwENs, TA FoRaIGN TAX CREorr § 3/2C (1961).
The holding of American Chicle prevailed generally until the Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-834, § 9(b), 76 Stat. 960, which added the "gross-up" requirement of I.R.C. § 78.
271. The definition of "taxpayer of a Contracting Party" will depend upon the taxing
state's test for taxable status: place of incorporation, registered head office (siege social) or
management and control. See, e.g., Convention on Double Taxation: Income and Capital Gains,
Dec. 31, 1975, United States-United Kingdom, art. 4(1) (a) (ii), (b)(ii), 2 TAx TRAnrms
(CCH) 8103D (this treaty is not yet in force, see note 241 supra).
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profits not actually received by the taxpayer, accumulated by an
entity organized under the laws of (or resident within) a third
state, in which the taxpayer holds an equity interest indirectly by
virtue of ownership of stock in a corporation organized under the
laws of (or resident within) the other Contracting Party, shall be
deemed to have paid such income taxes as have been paid to the
other Contracting Party by such corporation in respect of such
profits.
Under such a provision, "taxpayer" refers to the ultimate parent; "corporation" refers to the intermediate company; "entity" refers to the profitproducing enterprise at the bottom of the structure.
The treaty would continue:
(2) Such tax deemed paid shall not exceed the proportion of the
tax paid to the other Contracting Party by such corporation which
the percentage of such profits so included in the taxpayer's income
bears to the percentage of such profits taxed by the other Contracting Party.
Credit is allowed only for taxes paid in respect of income that has been
imputed to both the ultimate parent and the intermediate corporation. The
purpose of the credit is to avoid economic double taxation, not to reduce
taxing competence. The amount of credit allowed is determined by the use
of three fractions: (i) the percentage of lowest-tier income taxable to the
ultimate parent divided by (i) the percentage of lowest-tier income taxable
to the intermediate corporation, which gives (iii) the fraction to be applied
to the tax of the intermediate corporation. For example, if a Dutch company is entirely owned by a Canadian company, which in turn is entirely
owned by an American company, and Canada taxes half of the Dutch profits
while the United States taxes only a quarter of them, only half (25/50) of
the tax paid to Canada should be allowable as a credit against the United
States tax liability of the American shareholder.
The final clause of the proposed treaty would read:
(3) Such tax deemed paid shall not exceed the tax liability which
would have been incurred by the taxpayer to the Contracting Party
on the portion of such profits taxed by the other Contracting Party.
Clause 3 avoids a situation in which the state of the ultimate parent might
be subsidizing the state of the intermediate corporation by granting a credit
for a tax more onerous than its own.
The state of the ultimate parent would not "gross up" the deemed
distribution to its taxpayer by the amount of the credit granted with respect
of the tax imposed by the intervening state. To do so would result in a tax
base of greater than one hundred percent, thus defeating the object of the
272
provision.
272. For example, let us assume that company A, located in state X, owns all the shares
of company B, located in state Y, which in turn owns all the shares of company C, located
in state Z. The tax rates of X, Y, and Z are 50%, 50%, and 10% respectively. Assume
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2. Treaties Between Capital Exporter and Host State. In the event
that a capital-exporting state does enact a comprehensive accrual basis
regime for all income of all foreign companies, its effect should be mitigated
through partial allocation of exclusive fiscal competence to the host state.
The capital exporter could recognize the primacy of claims of host states
with more significant links to income from industries vital to their economic
development. The allocation could be made applicable to income of companies incorporated and managed in the other contracting state. Two approaches might be: (i) allocation of exclusive competence to the host state
for income of designated industries considered vital to its economy; or (ii)
allocation of exclusive jurisdiction over a fixed percentage of the income of
host state industries, perhaps determined according to a formula in which
weighted values were assigned to payroll (for the host state), local capital
(for the host state), and foreign equity (for the capital-exporting state).
The allocation should expressly take precedence over any savings clause
which might reserve to the capital-exporting state the right to tax its corporations as though the treaty had not come into effect.
CONCLUSION

Lord Devlin rightly noted that "the legislature can forge a sledgehammer capable of cracking open the corporate shell; and it can, if it chooses,
demand that the courts ignore all the conceptions and principles which are at
the root of company law." 273 Whether or not the legislature should do so,
however, depends on the social and economic consequences of applying the
doctrine of separate corporate personality in the area of international taxation. Relevant considerations may differ greatly from those that obtain in
275
company law 274 or in the presentation of international damage claims.
Assessing the merit of accrual basis regimes requires judgments as to
what type of multinational business activity is desirable, and for whom. The
income of a company whose shareholder is subject to accrual basis taxation
further that states X and Y "gross up" the tax base of their residents by the amount of

credit granted for tax paid to state Z with respect to the profits of company C. On 100 units

of "tainted income," included by state X and state Y in the incomes of company A and

company B, the tax paid to state Y will be 40 units and the tax paid to state X will be nil.
But if state X "grossed up" the income of company A to include also the taxes paid to
state Y, the total tax base of company A for purpose of state X's tax would be 140 units;
the available tax credit would be only 50 units, leaving 20 units of tax to be paid by company A to state X. The global tax imposed would thus reach 70%.
273. Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N.V. v. Slatford, [1953] 1 Q.B. 248, 278. For a
philosopher's treatment of corporate personality, see H.L.A. HART, DEFiNrnoN AND THEORY IN
JURIsPRUDENCE 17-28 (1953).
274. Protecting shareholders from unlimited personal loss because of the torts or contracts
of the companies they own has been justified as a stimulant to investment. See T. HADDEN,
COMPANY LAW AND CAPrrALism 20-22 (2d ed. 1977); references cited in L. SEALY, CONMANY
LAW 36 n.1 (1971). For an account of a recent international incident where incorporation
did not insulate the parent shareholder from the contractual liabilities of its subsidiary, see R.
N, THm BADGER CASE (1977).
BLANPAI
275. The insistence on respect for corporate personality by the International Court of
Justice in the Barcelona Traction case was based on a fear of "an atmosphere of confusion
and insecurity in international economic relations resulting when shareholdings of multinational enterprises are widely held and frequently exchanged." Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [1970] I.C.J. 3, 49.
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may bear a greater tax burden than that of local competitors not subject to
the claims of several sovereigns. This extra tax burden will mean reduced
reinvestment of profits. Piercing the corporate veil may thus chill transnational business activity, decreasing the potential for synergistic joint ventures
among enterprises of different nationalities, 276 at least in activities where reinvestment of profits is critical to business expansion.
Assertions that reduced foreign investment will increase domestic employment remain unconvincing. The opposite result is to be expected in some
cases. American-owned production in foreign countries may be replaced
not by domestic facilities, but by competitive foreign-owned companies
operating within the foreign market.
Whether an accrual basis regime is fair to the taxpayer will depend on
whether shareholders do, in fact, control the earnings imputed to them.
Where such control does exist, an accrual basis regime may in some cases
further horizontal taxpayer equity between the shareholder of a domestic
company and the shareholder of a foreign one. Inequity will inevitably arise
in some cases under the German regime, since profits may be attributed even
to shareholders with a de minimis interest in the foreign company. The
United States, Canadian, and Japanese regimes are more equitable, because
they apply only to shareholders with at least ten percent voting power. All
four regimes, however, may operate to tax a minority shareholder on income
he cannot command, especially in industries where there exist valid business
reasons for reinvesting rather than distributing profits.
Under the present accrual basis regimes integration of shareholder and
company is a one-way street, adding foreign income but denying foreign
deductions. To be equitable, an accrual basis system that imputes foreign
company earnings to the shareholder should in turn allow the shareholder
to pierce the corporate veil to take deductions for foreign company losses.
The most serious foreseeable consequence of ending deferral for income
from industrial activity is that it may raise political and ecornomic tension
among trading and investment partners. The host state would be denied
competence to regulate reinvestment of local profits of the corporate entities
created by its laws and operating within its borders. These tensions might be
reduced through an allocation to capital-importing states of exclusive fiscal
competence over a portion of the locally generated income of their own corporations, at least as to industries vital to their economic development.
The scope of accrual basis regimes should be expanded only after a
study of the impact of such expansion on an industry-by-industry basis.
Accrual basis taxation may be appropriate to industries where reinvestment
of profits is not a critical factor in business expansion, or when repatriated
capital will be put to equally profitable domestic use. Extending accrual
basis taxation across the board to all types of income in all industries, however, would risk untoward economic and political consequences for both
capital-exporting and capital-importing states.
276. On the significance to international business of the joint venture subsidiary, see
Liebman, supra note 201.

